

6.3 Passive Core Cooling System

The primary function of the passive core cooling system is to provide emergency core cooling following postulated design basis events. To accomplish this primary function, the passive core cooling system is designed to perform the following functions:

- Emergency core decay heat removal

Provide core decay heat removal during transients, accidents or whenever the normal heat removal paths are lost. This heat removal function is available at reactor coolant system conditions including shutdowns. During refueling operations, when the IRWST is drained into the refueling cavity, other passive means of core decay heat removal are utilized. Subsection 6.3.3.4.4 provides a description of how this is accomplished.

- Reactor coolant system emergency makeup and boration

Provide reactor coolant system makeup and boration during transients or accidents when the normal reactor coolant system makeup supply from the chemical and volume control system is unavailable or is insufficient.

- Safety injection

Provide safety injection to the reactor coolant system to provide adequate core cooling for the complete range of loss of coolant accidents, up to and including the double-ended rupture of the largest primary loop reactor coolant system piping.

- Containment pH control

Provide for chemical addition to the containment during post-accident conditions to establish floodup chemistry conditions that support radionuclide retention with high radioactivity in containment and to prevent corrosion of containment equipment during long-term floodup conditions.

The passive core cooling system is designed to operate without the use of active equipment such as pumps and ac power sources. The passive core cooling system depends on reliable passive components and processes such as gravity injection and expansion of compressed gases. The passive core cooling system does require a one-time alignment of valves upon actuation of the specific components.

6.3.1 Design Basis

The passive core cooling system is designed to perform its safety-related functions based on the following considerations:

- It has component redundancy to provide confidence that its safety-related functions are performed, even in the unlikely event of the most limiting single failure occurring coincident with postulated design basis events.

- Components are designed and fabricated according to industry standard quality groups commensurate with its intended safety-related functions.
- It is tested and inspected at appropriate intervals, as defined by the ASME Code, Section XI, and by technical specifications.
- It performs its intended safety-related functions following events such as fire, internal missiles or pipe breaks.
- It is protected from the effects of external events such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods.
- It is designed to be sufficiently reliable, considering redundancy and diversity, to support the plant core melt frequency and significant release frequency goals.

6.3.1.1 Safety Design Basis

The passive core cooling system is designed to provide emergency core cooling during events involving increases and decreases in secondary side heat removal and decreases in reactor coolant system inventory. Subsection 6.3.3 provides a description of the design basis events. The performance criteria are provided in subsection 6.3.1 and also described in Chapter 15, under the respective event sections.

6.3.1.1.1 Emergency Core Decay Heat Removal

For postulated non-LOCA events, where a loss of capability to remove core decay heat via the steam generators occurs, the passive core cooling system is designed to perform the following functions:

- The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger automatically actuates to provide reactor coolant system cooling and to prevent water relief through the pressurizer safety valves.
- The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is capable of automatically removing core decay heat following such an event, assuming the steam generated in the in-containment refueling water storage tank is condensed on the containment vessel and returned by gravity via the in-containment refueling water storage tank condensate return gutter.
- The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, in conjunction with the passive containment cooling system, is designed to remove decay heat for an indefinite time in a closed-loop mode of operation. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is designed to cool the reactor coolant system to 420°F in 36 hours, with or without reactor coolant pumps operating. This allows the reactor coolant system to be depressurized and the stress in the reactor coolant system and connecting pipe to be reduced to low levels. This also allows plant conditions to be established for initiation of normal residual heat removal system operation.
- During a steam generator tube rupture event, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger removes core decay heat and reduces reactor coolant system temperature and

pressure, equalizing with steam generator pressure and terminating break flow, without overfilling the steam generator.

6.3.1.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Emergency Makeup and Boration

For postulated non-LOCA events, sufficient core makeup water inventory is automatically provided to keep the core covered and to allow for decay heat removal. In addition, this makeup prevents actuation of the automatic depressurization system for a significant time.

For postulated events resulting in an inadvertent cooldown of the reactor coolant system, such as a steam line break, sufficient borated water is automatically provided to makeup for reactor coolant system shrinkage. The borated water also counteracts the reactivity increase caused by the resulting system cooldown.

For a Condition II steam line break described in Chapter 15, return to power is acceptable if there is no core damage. For this event, the automatic depressurization system is not actuated.

For a large steam line break, the peak return to power is limited so that the offsite dose limits are satisfied. Following either of these events, the reactor is automatically brought to a subcritical condition.

For safe shutdown, the passive core cooling system is designed to supply sufficient boron to the reactor coolant system to maintain the technical specification shutdown margin for cold, post-depressurization conditions, with the most reactive rod fully withdrawn from the core. The automatic depressurization system is not expected to actuate for these events.

6.3.1.1.3 Safety Injection

The passive core cooling system provides sufficient water to the reactor coolant system to mitigate the effects of a loss of coolant accident. In the event of a large loss of coolant accident, up to and including the rupture of a hot or cold leg pipe, where essentially all of the reactor coolant volume is initially displaced, the passive core cooling system rapidly refills the reactor vessel, refloods the core, and continuously removes the core decay heat. A large break is a rupture with a total cross-sectional area equal to or greater than one square foot. Although the criteria for mechanistic pipe break are used to limit the size of pipe rupture considered in the design and evaluation of piping systems, as described in subsection 3.6.3, such criteria are not used in the design of the passive core cooling system.

Sufficient water is provided to the reactor vessel following a postulated loss of coolant accident so that the performance criteria for emergency core cooling systems, described in Chapter 15, are satisfied.

The automatic depressurization system valves, provided as part of the reactor coolant system, are designed so that together with the passive core cooling system they:

- Satisfy the small loss of coolant accident performance requirements

- Provide effective core cooling for loss of coolant accidents from when the passive core cooling system is actuated through the long-term cooling mode.

6.3.1.1.4 Safe Shutdown

The functional requirements for the passive core cooling system specify that the plant be brought to a stable condition using the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger for events not involving a loss of coolant. For these events, the passive core cooling system, in conjunction with the passive containment cooling system, has the capability to establish safe shutdown conditions, cooling the reactor coolant system to about 420°F in 36 hours, with or without the reactor coolant pumps operating.

The core makeup tanks automatically provide injection to the reactor coolant system as the temperature decreases and pressurizer level decreases, actuating the core makeup tanks. The passive core cooling system can maintain stable plant conditions for a long time in this mode of operation, depending on the reactor coolant leakage and the availability of ac power sources. For example, with a technical specification leak rate of 10 gpm, stable plant conditions can be maintained for at least 10 hours. With a smaller leak a longer time is available. However in scenarios when ac power sources are unavailable for as long as 24 hours, the automatic depressurization system will automatically actuate.

For loss of coolant accidents and other postulated events where ac power sources are lost, or when the core makeup tank levels reach the automatic depressurization system actuation setpoint, the automatic depressurization system initiates. This results in injection from the accumulators and subsequently from the in-containment refueling water storage tank, once the reactor coolant system is nearly depressurized. For these conditions, the reactor coolant system depressurizes to saturated conditions at about 250°F within 24 hours. The passive core cooling system can maintain this safe shutdown condition indefinitely for the plant.

The basis used to define the passive core cooling system functional requirements are derived from Section 7.4 of the Standard Review Plan. The functional requirements are met over the range of anticipated events and single failure assumptions. The primary function of the passive core cooling system during a safe shutdown using only safety-related equipment is to provide a means for boration, injection, and core cooling. Details of the safe shutdown design bases are presented in subsection 5.4.7 and Section 7.4.

6.3.1.1.5 Containment pH Control

The passive core cooling system is capable of maintaining the desired post-accident pH conditions in the recirculation water after containment floodup. The pH adjustment is capable of maintaining containment pH within a range of 7.0 to 9.5, to enhance radionuclide retention in the containment and to prevent stress corrosion cracking of containment components during long-term containment floodup.

6.3.1.1.6 Reliability Requirements

The passive core cooling system satisfies a variety of reliability requirements, including redundancy (such as for components, power supplies, actuation signals, and instrumentation), equipment testing to confirm operability, procurement of qualified components, and provisions for periodic maintenance. In addition, the system provides protection in a number of areas including:

- Single active and passive component failures
- Spurious failures
- Physical damage from fires, flooding, missiles, pipe whip, and accident loads
- Environmental conditions such as high-temperature steam and containment floodup

Subsection 6.3.1.2 includes specific nonsafety-related design requirements that help to confirm satisfactory system reliability.

6.3.1.2 Power Generation Design Basis

The passive core cooling system is designed to be sufficiently reliable to support the probabilistic risk analysis goals for core damage frequency and severe release frequency. In assessing the reliability for probabilistic risk analysis purposes, more realistic analysis is used for both the passive core cooling system performance and for plant response.

In the event of a small loss of coolant accident, the passive core cooling system limits the increase in peak clad temperature and core uncover with design basis assumptions. For pipe ruptures of less than eight-inch nominal diameter size, the passive core cooling system is designed to prevent core uncover with best estimate assumptions.

The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger and the in-containment refueling water storage tank are designed to delay significant steam release to the containment for at least one hour.

The frequency of automatic depressurization system actuation is limited to a low probability to reduce safety risks and to minimize plant outages. Equipment is located so that it is not flooded or it is designed so that it is not damaged by the flooding. Major plant equipment is designed for multiple occurrences without damage.

The pH control equipment is designed to minimize the potential for and the impact of inadvertent actuation.

The passive core cooling system is capable of supporting the required testing and maintenance, including capabilities to isolate and drain equipment.

6.3.2 System Design

The passive core cooling system is a seismic Category I, safety-related system. It consists of two core makeup tanks, two accumulators, the in-containment refueling water storage tank, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, pH adjustment baskets, and associated piping, valves, instrumentation, and other related equipment. The automatic depressurization system valves and

spargers, which are part of the reactor coolant system, also provide important passive core cooling functions.

The passive core cooling system is designed to provide adequate core cooling in the event of design basis events. The redundant onsite safety-related class 1E dc and UPS system provides power such that protection is provided for a loss of ac power sources, coincident with an event, assuming a single failure has occurred.

6.3.2.1 Schematic Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams

Figures 6.3-1 and 6.3-2 show the piping and instrumentation drawings of the passive core cooling system. Simplified flow diagrams are shown in Figures 6.3-3 and 6.3-4. The accident analysis results of events analyzed in Chapter 15 provide a summary of the expected fluid conditions in the passive core cooling system for the various locations shown on the simplified flow diagrams, for the specific plant conditions identified -- safety injection and decay heat removal.

The passive core cooling system is designed to supply the core cooling flow rates to the reactor coolant system specified in Chapter 15 for the accident analyses. The accident analyses flow rates and heat removal rates are calculated by assuming a range of component parameters, including best estimate and conservatively high and low values.

The passive core cooling system design is based on the six major components, listed in subsection 6.3.2.2, that function together in various combinations to support the four passive core cooling system functions:

- Emergency decay heat removal
- Emergency reactor makeup/boration
- Safety injection
- Containment pH control

6.3.2.1.1 Emergency Core Decay Heat Removal at High Pressure and Temperature Conditions

For events not involving a loss of coolant, the emergency core decay heat removal is provided by the passive core cooling system via the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. The heat exchanger consists of a bank of C-tubes, connected to a tubesheet and channel head arrangement at the top (inlet) and bottom (outlet). The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger connects to the reactor coolant system through an inlet line from one reactor coolant system hot leg (through a tee from one of the fourth stage automatic depressurization lines) and an outlet line to the associated steam generator cold leg plenum (reactor coolant pump suction).

The inlet line is normally open and connects to the upper passive residual heat removal heat exchanger channel head. The inlet line is connected to the top of the hot leg and is routed continuously upward to the high point near the heat exchanger inlet. The normal water temperature in the inlet line will be hotter than the discharge line.

The outlet line contains normally closed air-operated valves that open on loss of air pressure or on control signal actuation. The alignment of the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger (with

a normally open inlet motor-operated valve and normally closed outlet air-operated valves) maintains the heat exchanger full of reactor coolant at reactor coolant system pressure. The water temperature in the heat exchanger is about the same as the water in the in-containment refueling water storage tank, so that a thermal driving head is established and maintained during plant operation.

The heat exchanger is elevated above the reactor coolant system loops to induce natural circulation flow through the heat exchanger when the reactor coolant pumps are not available. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger piping arrangement also allows actuation of the heat exchanger with reactor coolant pumps operating. When the reactor coolant pumps are operating, they provide forced flow in the same direction as natural circulation flow through the heat exchanger. If the pumps are operating and subsequently trip, then natural circulation continues to provide the driving head for heat exchanger flow.

The heat exchanger is located in the in-containment refueling water storage tank, which provides the heat sink for the heat exchanger.

Although gas accumulation is not expected, there is a vertical pipe stub on the top of the inlet piping high point that serves as a gas collection chamber. Level detectors indicate when gases have collected in this area. There are provisions to allow the operators to open manual valves to locally vent these gases to the in-containment refueling water storage tank.

The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, in conjunction with the passive containment cooling system, can provide core cooling for an indefinite period of time. After the in-containment refueling water storage tank water reaches its saturation temperature (in about 2 hours), the process of steaming to the containment initiates.

Condensation occurs on the steel containment vessel, which is cooled by the passive containment cooling system. The condensate is collected in a safety-related gutter arrangement located at the operating deck level which returns the condensate to the in-containment refueling water storage tank. The gutter normally drains to the containment sump, but when the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger actuates, safety-related isolation valves in the gutter drain line shut and the gutter overflow returns directly to the in-containment refueling water storage tank. Recovery of the condensate maintains the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger heat sink for an indefinite period of time.

The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is used to maintain a safe shutdown condition. It removes decay heat and sensible heat from the reactor coolant system to the in-containment refueling water storage tank, the containment atmosphere, the containment vessel, and finally to the ultimate heat sink—the atmosphere outside of containment. This occurs after in-containment refueling water storage tank saturation is reached and steaming to containment initiates.

6.3.2.1.2 Reactor Coolant System Emergency Makeup and Boration

The core makeup tanks provide reactor coolant system makeup and boration during events not involving loss of coolant when the normal makeup system is unavailable or insufficient. There are two core makeup tanks located inside the containment at an elevation slightly above the reactor

coolant loops. During normal operation, the core makeup tanks are completely full of cold, borated water. The boration capability of these tanks provides adequate core shutdown margin following a steam line break.

The core makeup tanks are connected to the reactor coolant system through a discharge injection line and an inlet pressure balance line connected to a cold leg. The discharge line is blocked by two normally closed, parallel air-operated isolation valves that open on a loss of air pressure or electrical power, or on control signal actuation. The core makeup tank discharge isolation valves are diverse from the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger outlet isolation valves discussed above. They use different globe valve body styles and different air operator types.

The pressure balance line from the cold leg is normally open to maintain the core makeup tanks at reactor coolant system pressure, which prevents water hammer upon initiation of core makeup tank injection.

The cold leg pressure balance line is connected to the top of the cold leg and is routed continuously upward to the high point near the core makeup tank inlet. The normal water temperature in this line will be hotter than the discharge line.

The outlet line from the bottom of each core makeup tank provides an injection path to one of the two direct vessel injection lines, which are connected to the reactor vessel downcomer annulus. Upon receipt of a safeguards actuation signal, the two parallel valves in each discharge line open to align the associated core makeup tank to the reactor coolant system.

There are two operating processes for the core makeup tanks, steam-compensated injection and water recirculation. During steam-compensated injection, steam is supplied to the core makeup tanks to displace the water that is injected into the reactor coolant system. This steam is provided to the core makeup tanks through the cold leg pressure balance line. The cold leg line only has steam flow if the cold legs are voided.

During water recirculation, hot water from the cold leg enters the core makeup tanks, and the cold water in the tank is discharged to the reactor coolant system. This results in reactor coolant system boration and a net increase in reactor coolant system mass.

The operating process for the core makeup tanks depends on conditions in the reactor coolant system, primarily voiding in the cold leg. When the cold leg is full of water, the cold leg pressure balance line remains full of water and the injection occurs via water recirculation. If reactor coolant system inventory decreases sufficiently to cause cold leg voiding, then steam flows through the cold leg balance lines to the core makeup tanks.

Following an event such as steam-line break, the reactor coolant system experiences a decrease in temperature and pressure due to an increase of energy removed by the secondary system as a consequence of the break. The cooldown results in a reduction of the core shutdown margin due to the negative moderator temperature coefficient. There is a potential return to power, assuming the most reactive rod cluster control assembly is stuck in its fully withdrawn position. The actuation of the core makeup tanks following this event provides injection of borated water via water recirculation to mitigate the reactivity transient and provide the required shutdown margin.

In case of a steam generator tube rupture, core makeup tank injection together with the steam generator overfill prevention logic terminates the reactor coolant system leak into the steam generator. This occurs without actuation of the automatic depressurization system and without operator action. In a steam generator tube rupture, the core makeup tanks operate in the water recirculation mode to provide borated water to compensate for reactor coolant system inventory losses and to borate the reactor coolant system. In case of a leak rate of 10 gallons per minute, the passive core cooling system can delay the automatic depressurization system actuation for at least 10 hours while providing makeup water to the reactor coolant system. After the actuation of the automatic depressurization system, the passive core cooling system provides sufficient borated water to compensate for reactor coolant system shrinkage and to provide the reactor coolant system boration.

6.3.2.1.3 Safety Injection During Loss of Coolant Accidents

The passive core cooling system uses four different sources of passive injection during loss of coolant accidents.

- Accumulators provide a very high flow for a limited duration of several minutes.
- The core makeup tanks provide a relatively high flow for a longer duration.
- The in-containment refueling water storage tank provides a lower flow, but for a much longer time.
- The containment is the final long-term source of water. It becomes available following the injection of the other three sources and floodup of containment.

The operation of the core makeup tanks is described in the subsection 6.3.2.1.2. During a loss of coolant accident, they provide injection rates commensurate with the severity of the loss of coolant accident. For a larger loss of coolant accident, and after the automatic depressurization system has been actuated, the cold legs are expected to be voided. In this situation, the core makeup tanks operate at their maximum injection rate with steam entering the core makeup tanks through the cold leg pressure balance lines.

Downstream of the parallel discharge isolation valves, the core makeup tank discharge line contains two check valves, in series, that normally remain open with or without flow in the line. These valves prevent reverse flow through this line, from the accumulator, that would bypass the reactor vessel in the event of a larger loss of coolant accident in the cold leg or the cold leg pressure balance line.

For smaller loss of coolant accidents the core makeup tanks initially operate in the water recirculation mode since the cold legs are water filled. During this water recirculation, the core makeup tanks remain full, but the cold, borated water is purged with hot, less borated cold leg water. The water recirculation provides reactor coolant system makeup and also effectively borates the reactor coolant system. As the accident progresses, when the cold legs void, the core makeup tanks switch to the steam displacement mode which provides higher flow rates.

The two accumulators contain borated water and a compressed nitrogen cover gas to provide rapid injection. They are located inside the reactor containment and the discharge from each tank is connected to one of the direct vessel injection lines. These lines connect to the reactor vessel downcomer. A deflector in the annulus directs the water flow downward to minimize core bypass flow. The water and gas volumes and the discharge line resistance provide several minutes of injection in a large loss of coolant accident.

The in-containment refueling water storage tank is located in the containment at an elevation slightly above the reactor coolant system loop piping. Reactor coolant system injection is possible only after the reactor coolant system has been depressurized by the automatic depressurization system or by a loss of coolant accident. Squib valves in the in-containment refueling water storage tank injection lines open automatically on a 4th stage automatic depressurization signal. Check valves, arranged in series with the squib valves, open when the reactor pressure decreases to below the in-containment refueling water storage tank injection head.

After the accumulators, core makeup tanks, and the in-containment refueling water storage tank inject, the containment is flooded up to a level sufficient to provide recirculation flow through the gravity injection lines back into the reactor coolant system.

The time that it takes until the initiation of containment recirculation flow varies greatly, depending on the specific event. With a break in a direct vessel injection line, the in-containment refueling water storage tank spills out through the break and floods the containment, along with reactor coolant system leakage, and recirculation can occur in several hours. In the event of automatic depressurization without a reactor coolant system break and with condensate return, the in-containment refueling water storage tank level decreases very slowly. Recirculation may not initiate for several days.

Containment recirculation initiates when the recirculation line valves are open and the containment floodup level is sufficiently high. When the in-containment refueling water storage tank level decreases to a low level, the containment recirculation squib valves automatically open to provide redundant flow paths from the containment to the reactor.

These recirculation flow paths can also provide a suction flow path from the containment to the normal residual heat removal pumps, when they are operating after containment flood up. In addition, the squib valves in the recirculation paths containing normally open motor-operated valves can be manually opened to intentionally drain the in-containment refueling water storage tank to the reactor cavity during severe accidents. This action is modeled in the AP1000 probabilistic risk assessment.

A range of break sizes and locations are analyzed to verify the adequacy of passive core cooling system injection. These events include a no-break case, a complete severance of one (eight-inch) direct vessel injection line case, and other smaller break cases. Successful reactor coolant system depressurization to in-containment refueling water storage tank injection is achieved, as shown in Chapter 15.

In larger loss of coolant accidents, including double ended ruptures in reactor coolant system piping, the passive core cooling system can provide a large flow rate, from the accumulators, to

quickly refill the reactor vessel lower plenum and downcomer. The accumulators provide the required injection flow during the first part of the event including refilling the downcomer and lower plenum and partially reflooding the core. After the accumulators empty, the core makeup tanks complete the reflooding of the core. The subsequent in-containment refueling water storage tank injection and recirculation provide long-term cooling. Both injection lines are available since the injection lines are not the source of a large pipe break.

6.3.2.1.4 Containment pH Control

Control of the pH in the containment sump water post-accident is achieved through the use of pH adjustment baskets containing granulated trisodium phosphate (TSP). The baskets are located below the minimum post-accident floodup level, and chemical addition is initiated passively when the water reaches the baskets. The baskets are placed at least a foot above the floor to reduce the chance that water spills in containment will dissolve the TSP.

The TSP is designed to maintain the pH of the containment sump water in a range from 7.0 to 9.5. This chemistry reduces radiolytic formation of elemental iodine in the containment sump, consequently reducing the aqueous production of organic iodine, and ultimately reducing the airborne iodine in containment and offsite doses.

The chemical addition also helps to reduce the potential for stress corrosion cracking of stainless steel components in a post floodup condition, where chlorides can leach out of the containment concrete and potentially affect these components during a long-term floodup event.

6.3.2.1.5 Passive Core Cooling System Actuation

Table 6.3-1 lists the remotely actuated valves used by the various passive core cooling system components. The engineered safeguards features actuation signals used for these valves are described in Section 7.3. Table 6.3-1 shows the normal valve position, the valve position to actuate the associated component, and the failure position of the valve. The failed position represents the position that the valve fails upon loss of electrical power or other motive sources, such as instrument air.

Table 6.3-3 contains the failure mode and effects analysis of the passive core cooling system.

6.3.2.2 Equipment and Component Descriptions

Table 6.3-2 contains a summary of equipment parameters for major components of the passive core cooling system.

6.3.2.2.1 Core Makeup Tanks

The two core makeup tanks are vertical, cylindrical tanks with hemispherical upper and lower heads. They are made of carbon steel, clad on the internal surfaces with stainless steel. The core makeup tanks are AP1000 Equipment Class A and are designed to meet seismic Category I requirements. They are located inside containment on the 107-foot floor elevation. The core

makeup tanks are located above the direct vessel injection line connections to the reactor vessel, which are located at an elevation near the bottom of the hot leg.

During normal operation the core makeup tanks are completely filled with borated water and are maintained at reactor coolant system pressure by the cold leg pressure balance line. The temperature of the borated water in the core makeup tanks is about the same as the containment ambient temperature since the tanks are not insulated or heated.

The inlet line from the cold leg is sized for loss of coolant accidents, where the cold legs become voided and higher core makeup tank injection flows are required. The discharge line from each core makeup tank contains a flow-tuning orifice that provides a mechanism for the field adjustment of the injection line resistance. The orifice is used to establish the required flow rates assumed in the core makeup tank design. The core makeup tanks provide injection for an extended time after core makeup tank actuation. The duration of injection will be much longer when the core makeup tanks operate in the water recirculation mode as compared to the steam condensation mode.

Connections are provided for remotely adjusting the boron concentration of the borated water in each core makeup tank during normal plant operation, as required. Makeup water for the core makeup tank is provided by the chemical and volume control system. Samples from the core makeup tanks are taken periodically to check boron concentration.

Each core makeup tank has an inlet diffuser which is designed to reduce steam velocities entering the core makeup tank; thereby minimizing potential water hammer and reducing the amount of mixing that occurs during initial core makeup tank operation. The inlet diffuser flow area is $\geq 165 \text{ in}^2$.

The core makeup tanks are located inside the containment but outside the secondary shield wall. This facilitates maintenance and inspection.

Core makeup tank level and inlet and outlet line temperatures are monitored by indicators and alarms. The operator can take action as required to meet the technical specification requirements for core makeup tank operability.

6.3.2.2.2 Accumulators

The two accumulators are spherical tanks made of carbon steel and clad on the internal surfaces with stainless steel. The accumulators are AP1000 Equipment Class C and are designed to meet seismic Category I requirements. They are located inside the containment on the floor just below the core makeup tanks.

The accumulators are mostly filled with borated water and pressurized with nitrogen gas. The temperature of the borated water in the accumulators is about the same as the containment ambient temperature since the tanks are not insulated or heated. Each accumulator is connected to one of the direct vessel injection lines. During normal operation, the accumulator is isolated from the reactor coolant system by two check valves in series. When the reactor coolant system pressure falls below the accumulator pressure, the check valves open and borated water is forced into the

reactor coolant system by the gas pressure. Mechanical operation of the check valves is the only action required to open the injection path from the accumulators to the core.

The accumulators are designed to deliver a high flow of borated water to the reactor vessel in the event of a large loss of coolant accident. This large flow rate is used to quickly establish core cooling following the large loss of reactor coolant system inventory.

The injection line from each accumulator contains a flow-tuning orifice that provides a mechanism for the field adjustment of the injection line resistance. The orifice is used to establish the required flow rates assumed in the accumulator design. The accumulator provides injection for several minutes after reactor coolant system pressure drops below the static accumulator pressure.

Connections are provided for remotely adjusting the level and boron concentration of the borated water in each accumulator during normal plant operation, as required. Accumulator water level may be adjusted either by draining or by pumping borated water from the chemical and volume control system to the accumulator. Samples from the accumulators are taken periodically to check the boron concentration.

Accumulator pressure is provided by a supply of nitrogen gas and can be adjusted as required during normal plant operation. However, the accumulators are normally isolated from the nitrogen supply. Gas relief valves on the accumulators protect them from overpressurization. The system also includes the capability to remotely vent gas from the accumulator, if required.

The accumulators are located inside the containment and outside the secondary shield wall. This facilitates maintenance and inspection.

Accumulator level and pressure are monitored by indication and alarms. The operator can take action, as required, to meet the technical specification requirements for accumulator operability.

6.3.2.2.3 In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank

The in-containment refueling water storage tank is a large, stainless-steel lined tank located underneath the operating deck inside the containment. The in-containment refueling water storage tank is AP1000 Equipment Class C and is designed to meet seismic Category I requirements. The tank is constructed as an integral part of the containment internal structures, and is isolated from the steel containment vessel. See subsection 3.8.3 for additional information.

The bottom of the in-containment refueling water storage tank is above the reactor coolant system loop elevation so that the borated refueling water can drain by gravity into the reactor coolant system after it is sufficiently depressurized. The in-containment refueling water storage tank is connected to the reactor coolant system through both direct vessel injection lines. The in-containment refueling water storage tank contains borated water, at the existing temperature and pressure in containment.

Vents are installed in the roof of the in-containment refueling water storage tank. These vents are normally closed in order to contain water vapor and radioactive gases within the tank during normal operation and to prevent debris from entering the tank from the containment operating

deck. The vents open with a slight pressurization of the in-containment refueling water storage tank. These vents provide a path to vent steam released by the spargers or generated by the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, into the containment atmosphere. Other vents also open on small pressure differentials to allow air/steam to enter the in-containment refueling water storage tank from containment, such as during a loss of coolant accident, to prevent damage to the tank. Overflows are provided from the in-containment refueling water storage tank to the refueling cavity to accommodate volume and mass increases during passive residual heat removal heat exchanger or automatic depressurization system operation, while minimizing the floodup of the containment.

The IRWST is stainless steel lined and does not contain material either in the tank or the recirculation path that could plug the outlet screens.

The in-containment refueling water storage tank contains one passive residual heat removal heat exchanger and two depressurization spargers. The top of the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger tubes are located underwater and extend down into the in-containment refueling water storage tank. The spargers are also submerged in the in-containment refueling water storage tank, with the spargers midarms located below the normal water level.

The in-containment refueling water storage tank is sized to provide the flooding of the refueling cavity for normal refueling, the post-loss of coolant accident flooding of the containment for reactor coolant system long-term cooling mode, and to support the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger operation. Flow out of the in-containment refueling water storage tank during the injection mode includes conservative allowances for spill flow during a direct vessel injection line break.

The in-containment refueling water storage tank can provide sufficient injection until the containment sump floods up high enough to initiate recirculation flow. The injection duration varies greatly, depending upon the specific event. A direct vessel injection line break more rapidly drains the in-containment refueling water storage tank and speeds containment floodup.

The containment floodup volume for a LOCA in PXS room B is less than 73,500 ft³ (excluding the in-containment refueling water storage tank) below a containment elevation of 108 feet.

Connections to the in-containment refueling water storage tank provide for transfer to and from the reactor coolant system/refueling cavity via the normal residual heat removal system, purification and sampling via the spent fuel pit cooling system, and remotely adjusting boron concentration to the chemical and volume control system. Also, the normal residual heat removal system can provide cooling of the in-containment refueling water storage.

In-containment refueling water storage tank level and temperature are monitored by indicators and alarms. The operator can take action, as required, to meet the technical specification requirements for in-containment refueling water storage tank operability.

6.3.2.2.4 pH Adjustment Baskets

The passive core cooling system utilizes pH adjustment baskets for control of the pH level in the containment sump. The baskets are made of stainless steel with a mesh front that readily permits contact with water. The baskets are designated AP1000 Equipment Class C, and are designed to meet seismic Category I requirements.

The total weight of TSP contained in the baskets is at least 26,460 pounds. The TSP, in granular form, is provided to raise the pH of the borated water in the containment following an accident to at least 7.0. After extended plant operation, the granular TSP may cake into a solid form as it absorbs moisture. Assuming that the TSP has caked, the dissolution time of the TSP is approximately 3 hours. Good mixing with the sump water is expected due to both basket construction and because the baskets are placed in locations conducive to recirculation flows post-accident. The baskets are designed for ease of replacement of the TSP.

6.3.2.2.5 Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger

The passive residual heat removal exchanger consists of inlet and outlet channel heads connected together by vertical C-shaped tubes. The tubes are supported inside the in-containment refueling water storage tank. The top of the tubes is several feet below the in-containment refueling water storage tank water surface. The component data for the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is shown in Table 6.3-2. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is AP1000 Equipment Class A and is designed to meet seismic Category I requirements.

The heat exchanger inlet piping connects to an inlet channel head located near the outside top of the tank. The inlet channel head and tubesheet are attached to the tank wall via an extension flange. The heat exchanger is supported by a frame which is attached to the IRWST floor and ceiling. The heat exchanger supports are designed to ASME Code, Section III, subsection NF. The extended flange is designed to accommodate thermal expansion. Figure 6.3-5 illustrates the relationship between these parts and the boundaries of design code jurisdiction. The heat exchanger outlet piping is connected to the outlet channel head, which is vertically below the inlet channel head, near the tank bottom. The outlet channel head has an identical structural configuration to the inlet channel head. Both channel head tubesheets are similar to the steam generator tubesheets and they have manways for inspection and maintenance access.

The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is designed to remove sufficient heat so that its operation, in conjunction with available inventory in the steam generators, provide reactor coolant system cooling and prevents water relief through the pressurizer safety valves during loss of main feedwater or main feedline break events.

Passive residual heat removal heat exchanger flow and inlet and outlet line temperatures are monitored by indicators and alarms. The operator can take action, as required, to meet the technical specification requirements or follow emergency operating procedures for control of the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger operation.

6.3.2.2.6 Depressurization Spargers

Two reactor coolant depressurization spargers are provided. Each one is connected to an automatic depressurization system discharge header (shared by three automatic depressurization system stages) and submerged in the in-containment refueling water storage tank. Each sparger has four branch arms inclined downward. The connection of the sparger branch arms to the sparger hub are submerged below the in-containment refueling water storage tank overflow level by ≤ 11.5 feet. The component data for the spargers is shown in Table 6.3-2. The spargers are AP1000 Equipment Class C and are designed to meet seismic Category I requirements.

The spargers perform a nonsafety-related function -- minimizing plant cleanup and recovery actions following automatic depressurization. They are designed to distribute steam into the in-containment refueling water storage tank, thereby promoting more effective steam condensation.

The first three stages of automatic depressurization system valves discharge through the spargers and are designed to pass sufficient depressurization venting flow, with an acceptable pressure drop, to support the depressurization system performance requirements. The installation of the spargers prevents undesirable and/or excessive dynamic loads on the in-containment refueling water storage tank and other structures.

Each sparger is sized to discharge at a flow rate that supports automatic depressurization system performance, which in turn, allows adequate passive core cooling system injection.

6.3.2.2.7 IRWST and Containment Recirculation Screens

The passive core cooling systems has two different sets of screens that are used following a LOCA; IRWST screens and containment recirculation screens. These screens prevent debris from entering the reactor and blocking core cooling passages during a LOCA. The screens are AP1000 Equipment Class C and are designed to meet seismic Category I requirements. The structural frames, attachment to the building structure, and attachment of the screen modules use the criteria of ASME Code, Section III Subsection NF. The screen modules are fabricated of sheet metal and are designed and fabricated to a manufacturer's standard. These screens are designed to comply with applicable licensing regulations including:

- GDC 35 of 10 CFR 50 Appendix A
- Regulatory Guide 1.82
- NUREG-0897

The operation of the passive core cooling system following a LOCA is described in subsection 6.3.2.1.3. Proper screen design, plant layout, and other factors prevent clogging of these screens by debris during accident operations.

6.3.2.2.7.1 General Screen Design Criteria

1. Screens are designed to Regulatory Guide 1.82, including:
 - Separate, large screens are provided for each function.
 - Screens are located well below containment floodup level. Each screen provides the function of a trash rack and a fine screen. A debris curb is provided to prevent high density debris from being swept along the floor to the screen face.
 - Floors slope away from screens (not required for AP1000).
 - Drains do not impinge on screens.
 - Screens can withstand accident loads and credible missiles.
 - Screens have conservative flow areas to account for plugging. Operation of the non-safety-related normal residual heat removal pumps with suction from the IRWST and the containment recirculation lines is considered in sizing screens.
 - System and screen performance are evaluated.
 - Screens have solid top cover. Containment recirculation screens have protective plates that are located no more than 1 foot above the top of the screens and extend at least 10 feet in front and 7 feet to the side of the screens. The plate dimensions are relative to the portion of the screens where water flow enters the screen openings. Coating debris, from coatings located outside of the ZOI, is not transported to the containment recirculation screens, to the IRWST screens, or into a direct vessel injection or a cold leg LOCA break that becomes submerged during recirculation considering the use of high density coatings discussed in subsection 6.1.2.1.5.
 - Screens are seismically qualified.
 - Screen openings are sized to prevent blockage of core cooling.
 - Screens are designed for adequate pump performance. AP1000 has no safety-related pumps.
 - Corrosion resistant materials are used for screens.
 - Access openings in screens are provided for screen inspection.
 - Screens are inspected each refueling.
2. Low screen approach velocities limit the transport of heavy debris even with operation of normal residual heat removal pumps.

3. *[Metal reflective insulation is used on ASME class 1 lines because they are subject to loss-of-coolant accidents. Metal reflective insulation is also used on the reactor vessel, the reactor coolant pumps, the steam generators, and on the pressurizer because they have relatively large insulation surface areas and they are located close to large ASME class 1 lines. As a result, they are subject to jet impingement during loss-of-coolant accidents.]** A suitable equivalent insulation to metal reflective may be used. A suitable equivalent insulation is one that is encapsulated in stainless steel that is seam welded so that LOCA jet impingement does not damage the insulation and generate debris. Another suitable insulation is one that may be damaged by LOCA jet impingement as long as the resulting insulation debris is not transported to the containment recirculation screens, to the IRWST screens, or into a direct vessel injection or a cold leg LOCA break that becomes submerged during recirculation. In order to qualify as a suitable equivalent insulation, testing must be performed that subjects the insulation to conditions that bound the AP1000 conditions and demonstrates that debris would not be generated. If debris is generated, testing and/or analysis must be performed to demonstrate that the debris is not transported to an AP1000 screen or into the core through a flooded break. It would also have to be shown that the material used would not generate chemical debris. In addition, the testing and/or analysis must be approved by the NRC.

*[In order to provide additional margin, metal reflective insulation is used inside containment where it would be subject to jet impingement during loss-of-coolant accidents that are not otherwise shielded from the blowdown jet.]** As a result, fibrous debris is not generated by loss-of-coolant accidents. Insulation located within the zone of influence (ZOI), which is a spherical region within a distance equal to 29 inside diameters (for Min-K, Koolphen-K, or rigid cellular glass insulation) or 20 inside diameters (for other types of insulation) of the LOCA pipe break is assumed to be affected by the LOCA when there are intervening components, supports, structures, or other objects.

*[The ZOI in the absence of intervening components, supports, structures, or other objects includes insulation in a cylindrical area extending out a distance equal to 45 inside diameters from the break along an axis that is a continuation of the pipe axis and up to 5 inside diameters in the radial direction from the axis.]** A suitable equivalent insulation to metal reflective may be used as discussed in the previous paragraph.

*[Insulation used inside the containment, outside the ZOI, but below the maximum post-DBA LOCA floodup water level (plant elevation 110.2 feet), is metal reflective insulation, jacketed fiberglass, or a suitable equivalent.]** A suitable equivalent insulation is one that would be restrained so that it would not be transported by the flow velocities present during recirculation and would not add to the chemical precipitates. In order to qualify as a suitable equivalent insulation, testing must be performed that subjects the insulation to conditions that bound the AP1000 conditions and demonstrates that debris would not be generated. If debris is generated, testing and/or analysis must be performed to demonstrate that the debris is not transported to an AP1000 screen or into the core through a flooded break. It would also have to be shown that the material used would not generate chemical debris. In addition, the testing and/or analysis must be approved by the NRC.

[Insulation used inside the containment, outside the ZOI, but above the maximum post-design basis accident (DBA) LOCA floodup water level, is jacketed fiberglass, rigid cellular

*NRC Staff approval is required prior to implementing a change in this information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.5.

*glass, or a suitable equivalent.]** A suitable equivalent insulation is one that when subjected to dripping of water from the containment dome would not add to the chemical precipitates; suitable equivalents include metal reflective insulation.

4. Coatings are not used on surfaces located close to the containment recirculation screens. The surfaces considered close to the screens are defined in subsection 6.3.2.2.7.3. Refer to subsection 6.1.2.1.6. These surfaces are constructed of materials that do not require coatings.
5. The IRWST is enclosed which limits debris egress to the IRWST screens.
6. Containment recirculation screens are located above lowest levels of containment.
7. Long settling times are provided before initiation of containment recirculation.
8. Air ingestion by safety-related pumps is not an issue in the AP1000 because there are no safety-related pumps. The normal residual heat removal system pumps are evaluated to show that they can operate with minimum water levels in the IRWST and in the containment.
9. A commitment for cleanliness program to limit debris in containment is provided in subsection 6.3.8.1.
10. *[Other potential sources of fibrous material, such as ventilation filters or fiber-producing fire barriers, are not located in jet impingement damage zones or below the maximum post-DBA LOCA floodup water level.]**
11. Other potential sources of transportable material, such as caulking, signs, and equipment tags installed inside the containment are located:
 - Below the maximum flood level, or
 - Above the maximum flood level and not inside a cabinet or enclosure.

Tags and signs in these locations are made of stainless steel or another metal that has a density $\geq 100 \text{ lbm/ft}^3$. Caulking in these locations is a high density ($\geq 100 \text{ lbm/ft}^3$).

The use of high-density metal prevents the production of debris that could be transported to the containment recirculation screens, to the IRWST screens, or into a direct vessel injection or a cold leg LOCA break location that is submerged during recirculation. If a high-density material is not used for these components, then the components must be located inside a cabinet or other enclosure, or otherwise shown not to transport; the enclosures do not have to be watertight, but need to prevent water dripping on them from creating a flow path that would transport the debris outside the enclosure. For light-weight ($< 100 \text{ lb}_m/\text{ft}^3$) caulking, signs or tags that are located outside enclosures, testing must be performed that subjects the caulking, signs, or tags to conditions that bound the AP1000 conditions and demonstrates that debris would not be transported to an AP1000 screen or into the core through a flooded break. Note that in determining if there is sufficient water flow to transport these materials, consideration needs to be given as to whether they are within the ZOI (for the material used) because that determines whether they are in their original geometry or have been reduced to

*NRC Staff approval is required prior to implementing a change in this information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.5.

smaller pieces. It would also have to be shown that the material used would not generate chemical debris. In addition, the testing must be approved by the NRC.

12. An evaluation consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.82, Revision 3, and subsequently approved NRC guidance, has been performed (Reference 3) to demonstrate that adequate long-term core cooling is available considering debris resulting from a LOCA together with debris that exists before a LOCA. As discussed in subsection 6.3.2.2.7.1, a LOCA in the AP1000 does not generate fibrous debris due to damage to insulation or other materials included in the AP1000 design. The evaluation considered resident fibers and particles that could be present considering the plant design, location, and containment cleanliness program. The determination of the characteristics of such resident debris was based on sample measurements from operating plants. The evaluation also considered the potential for the generation of chemical debris (precipitants). The potential to generate such debris was determined considering the materials used inside the AP1000 containment, the post-accident water chemistry of the AP1000, and the applicable research/testing.

The evaluation considered the following conservative considerations:

- *[The COL cleanliness program will limit the total amount of resident debris inside the containment to ≤ 130 pounds and the amount of the total that might be fiber to ≤ 6.6 pounds.]**
- In addition to the resident debris, the LOCA blowdown jet may impinge on coatings and generate coating debris fines, which because of their small size, might not settle. The amount of coating debris fines that can be generated in the AP1000 by a LOCA jet will be limited to less than 70 pounds for double-ended cold leg and double-ended direct vessel injection LOCAs. In evaluating this limit, a ZOI of 4 IDs for epoxy and 10 IDs for inorganic zinc will be used. A DEHL LOCA could generate more coating debris; however, with the small amount of fiber available in the AP1000 following a LOCA, the additional coating debris fines that may be generated in a DEHL LOCA are not limiting.
- The total resident and ZOI coating debris available for transport following a LOCA is ≤ 193.4 pounds of particulate and ≤ 6.6 pounds of fiber. The percentage of this debris that could be transported to the screens or to the core is as follows:
 - Containment recirculation screens is ≤ 100 percent fiber and particles
 - IRWST screens is ≤ 50 percent fiber and 100 percent particles
 - Core (via a direct vessel injection or a cold leg LOCA break that becomes submerged) is ≤ 90 percent fiber and 100 percent particles
- Fibrous insulation debris is not generated and transported to the screens or into the core as discussed in item 3.

*NRC Staff approval is required prior to implementing a change in this information; see DCD Introduction Section 3.5.

- Metal reflective insulation, including accident generated debris, is not transported to the screens or into the core.
- Coating debris is not transported to the screens or into the core as discussed in item 1.
- Debris from other sources, including caulking, signs, and tags, is not generated and transported to the screens or into the core as discussed in item 11.
- The total amount of chemical precipitates that could form in 30 days is ≤ 57 pounds.
- The percentage of the chemical precipitates that could be transported to the:
 - Containment recirculation screens is ≤ 100 percent.
 - IRWST screens is ≤ 100 percent.
 - Core is ≤ 100 percent.
- The range of flow rates during post-LOCA injection and recirculation is as follows:
 - CR screens: 2320 to 539 gpm
 - IRWST screens: 2320 to 464 gpm
 - Core: 2012 to 484 gpm

These flows bound operation of the PXS and the RNS. Note that if the RNS operates during post-LOCA injection or recirculation, the RNS flow is limited to 2320 gpm. This limit ensures that the operation of the plant is consistent with screen head loss testing. In addition, the screens will be designed structurally to withstand much higher flow rates and pressure losses to provide appropriate margin during PXS and RNS operation.

No chemical precipitates are expected to enter the IRWST because the primary water input to the IRWST is steam condensed on the containment vessel. However, during a direct vessel injection LOCA, recirculation can transport chemical debris through the containment recirculation screens and to the IRWST screens. As a result, 100 percent of the chemical debris is conservatively assumed to be transported to the IRWST screens.

The AP1000 containment recirculation screens and IRWST screens have been shown to have acceptable head losses. The head losses for these screens were determined in testing performed using the above conservative considerations. It has been shown that a head loss of 0.25 psi at the maximum screen flows is acceptable based on long-term core cooling sensitivity analysis.

Considering downstream effects as well as potential bypass through a cold leg LOCA, the core was shown to have acceptable head losses. The head losses for the core were determined in testing performed using the above conservative considerations. It has been shown that a head loss of 4.1 psi at these flows is acceptable based on long-term core cooling sensitivity analysis.

6.3.2.2.7.2 IRWST Screens

The IRWST screens are located inside the IRWST at the bottom of the tank. Figure 6.3-6 shows a plan view and Figure 6.3-7 shows a section view of these screens. Three separate screens are provided in the IRWST, one at either end of the tank and one in the center. A cross-connect pipe connects all three IRWST screens to distribute flow. The IRWST is closed off from the containment; its vents and overflows are normally closed by louvers. The potential for introducing debris inadvertently during plant operations is limited. A cleanliness program (refer to subsection 6.3.8.1) controls foreign debris from being introduced into the tank during maintenance and inspection operations. The Technical Specifications require visual inspections of the screens during every refueling outage.

The IRWST design eliminates sources of debris from inside the tank. Insulation is not used in the tank. Air filters are not used in the IRWST vents or overflows. Wetted surfaces in the IRWST are corrosion resistant such as stainless steel or nickel alloys; the use of these materials prevents the formation of significant amounts of corrosion products. In addition, the water is required to be clean because it is used to fill the refueling cavity for refueling; filtering and demineralizing by the spent fuel pit cooling system is provided during and after refueling.

During a LOCA, steam vented from the reactor coolant system condenses on the containment shell, drains down the shell to the operating deck elevation and is collected in a gutter. It is very unlikely that debris generated by a LOCA can reach the gutter because of its location. The gutter is covered with a trash rack which prevents larger debris from clogging the gutter or entering the IRWST through the two 4-inch drain pipes. The inorganic zinc coating applied to the inside surface of the containment shell is safety – Service Level I, and will stay in place and will not detach.

The design of the IRWST screens reduces the chance of debris reaching the screens. The screens are oriented vertically such that debris that settles out of the water does not fall on the screens. The lowest screening surface of the IRWST screens is located 6 inches above the IRWST floor to prevent high density debris from being swept along the floor by water flow to the IRWST screens. The screen design provides the trash rack function. This is accomplished by the screens having a large surface area to prevent a single object from blocking a large portion of the screen and by the screens having a robust design to preclude an object from damaging the screen and causing by-pass. The screen prevents debris larger than 0.0625 inch from being injected into the reactor coolant system and blocking fuel cooling passages. The screen is a type that has sufficient surface area to accommodate debris that could be trapped on the screen. The design of the IRWST screens is described further in APP-GW-GLN-147 (Reference 4).

The screen flow area is conservatively designed considering the operation of the nonsafety-related normal residual heat removal system pumps which produce a higher flow than the safety-related gravity driven IRWST injection/recirculation flows. As a result, when the normal residual heat removal system pumps are not operating, there is a large margin to screen clogging.

6.3.2.2.7.3 Containment Recirculation Screens

The containment recirculation screens are oriented vertically along walls above the loop compartment floor (elevation 83 feet). Figure 6.3-8 shows a plan view and Figure 6.3-9 shows a section view of these screens. Two separate screens are provided as shown in Figure 6.3-3. The loop compartment floor elevation is significantly above (11.5 feet) the lowest level in the containment, the reactor vessel cavity. A two-foot-high debris curb is provided in front of the screens.

During a LOCA, the reactor coolant system blowdown will tend to carry debris created by the accident (pipe whip/jets) into the cavity under the reactor vessel which is located away from and below the containment recirculation screens. As the accumulators, core makeup tanks and IRWST inject, the containment water level will slowly rise above the 108 foot elevation. The containment recirculation line opens when the water level in the IRWST drops to a low level setpoint a few feet above the final containment floodup level. When the recirculation lines initially open, the water level in the IRWST is higher than the containment water level and water flows from the IRWST backwards through the containment recirculation screen. This back flow tends to flush debris located close to the recirculation screens away from the screens. A flow connection between Screen A and Screen B is provided so that both recirculation screens will operate. This connection increases the reliability of the PXS in a PRA sequence where there are multiple failures of valves in one of the PXS subsystems.

The water level in the containment when recirculation begins is well above (~ 10 feet) the top of the recirculation screens. During the long containment floodup time, floating debris does not move toward the screens and heavy materials settle to the floors of the loop compartments or the reactor vessel cavity. During recirculation operation, the containment water level will not change significantly nor will it drop below the top of the screens.

The amount of debris that may exist following an accident is limited. Reflective insulation is used to preclude fibrous debris that can be generated by a loss of coolant accident and be postulated to reach the screens during recirculation. The nonsafety-related coatings used in the containment are designed to withstand the post accident environment. The containment recirculation screens are protected by plates located above them. These plates prevent debris from the failure of nonsafety-related coatings from getting into the water close to the screens such that the recirculation flow can cause the debris to be swept to the screens before it settles to the floor. Stainless steel is used on the underside of these plates and on surfaces located below the plates, above the bottom of the screens, 10 feet in front and 7 feet to the side of the screens to prevent coating debris from reaching the screens.

A cleanliness program (refer to subsection 6.3.8.1) controls foreign debris introduced into the containment during maintenance and inspection operations. The Technical Specifications require visual inspections of the screens during every refueling outage.

The design of the containment recirculation screens reduces the chance of debris reaching the screens. The screens are orientated vertically such that debris settling out of the water will not fall on the screens. The protective plates described above provide additional protection to the screens from debris. A 2-foot-high debris curb is provided to prevent high density debris from being swept

along the floor by water flow to the containment recirculation screens. The screen design provides the trash rack function. This is accomplished by the screens having a large surface area to prevent a single object from blocking a large portion of the screen and by the screens having a robust design to preclude an object from damaging the screen and causing by-pass. The screen prevents debris larger than 0.0625 inch from being injected into the reactor coolant system and blocking fuel cooling passages. The screen is a type that has more surface area to accommodate debris that could be trapped on the screen. The design of the containment recirculation screens is further described in APP-GW-GLN-147 (Reference 4).

The screen flow area is conservatively designed, considering the operation of the normal residual heat removal system pumps, which produce a higher flow than the gravity driven IRWST injection/recirculation flows. As a result, when the normal residual heat removal system pumps are not operating there is even more margin in screen clogging.

6.3.2.2.8 Valves

Design features used to minimize leakage for valves in the passive core cooling system include:

- Packless valves are used for manual isolation valves that are 2 inches or smaller.
- Valves which are normally open, except check valves and those which perform control function, are provided with back seats to limit stem leakage.

6.3.2.2.8.1 Manual Globe, Gate, and Check Valves

Gate valves have backseats and external screw and yoke assemblies.

Globe valves, both “T” and “Y” styles, are full-ported with external screw and yoke construction.

Stainless steel check valves have no penetration welds other than the inlet, outlet, and bonnet. The check valve hinge is serviced through the bonnet.

The gasket of the stainless steel manual globe and gate valves is similar to those described in subsection 6.3.2.2.8.3 for motor-operated valves.

6.3.2.2.8.2 Manual Valves

Manual valves are generally used as maintenance isolation valves. When used for this function they are under administrative control. They are located so that no single valve can isolate redundant passive core cooling system equipment or they are provided with alarms in the main control room to indicate mispositioning.

To help preclude the possibility of passive core cooling system degradation due to valve mispositioning, line connections such as vent and drain lines, test connections, pressure points, flow element test points, flush connections, local sample points, and bypass lines are provided

with double isolation or sealed barriers. The isolation is provided by one of the following methods:

- Two valves in series
- A single valve with a screwed cap or blind flange
- A single locked-closed valve
- A blind flange

6.3.2.2.8.3 Motor-Operated Valves

The motor operators for gate valves are conservatively sized, considering the frictional component of the hydraulic unbalance on the valve disc, the disc face friction, and the packing box friction. For motor-operated valves, the valve disc is guided throughout the full disc travel to prevent chattering and to provide ease of gate movement. The seating surfaces are hard-faced to prevent galling and to reduce wear.

Where a gasket is employed for the body to bonnet joint, it is either a fully trapped, controlled compression, spiral wound asbestos (or a qualified asbestos substitute) gasket with provisions for seal welding or it is of the pressure seal design with provisions for seal welding.

The motor operator incorporates a hammer-blow feature that allows the motor to impact the disc away from the back seat upon closing. This hammer-blow feature impacts the discs and allows the motor to attain its operational speed prior to impact.

6.3.2.2.8.4 Motor-Operated Valve Controls

Remotely operated valves which do not receive a safeguards actuation signal, have their positions indicated on the main control board. When one of these valves is not in the ready position for injection during plant operation, this condition is indicated and alarmed in the main control room.

Spurious movement of a motor-operated valve due to an electrical fault in the motor actuation circuitry, coincident with loss of coolant accident, has been analyzed (Reference 1) and found to be an acceptably low probability event. In addition, power lockout in accordance with Branch Technical Position ICSB-18 is provided for those valves whose spurious movement could result in degraded passive core cooling system performance.

Table 6.3-1 provides a list of the remotely operated isolation valves in the passive core cooling system. These valves have various interlocks, automatic features, and position indication. Some valves have their control power locked out during normal plant operation. Periodic visual inspection and operability testing of the motor-operated valves in the passive core cooling system confirm valve operability. In addition, the location of the motor-operated valves within the containment, which are identified in Table 6.3-1, has been examined to identify remotely operated valves which may be submerged following a postulated loss of coolant accident.

See Section 3.4 for additional information on containment flooding effects.

6.3.2.2.8.5 Automatic Depressurization Valves

The automatic depressurization system consists of four different stages of valves. The first three stages each have two lines and each line has two valves in series; both normally closed. The fourth stage has four lines with each line having two valves in series; one normally open and one normally closed. The four stages, therefore, include a total of 20 valves. The four valve stages open sequentially.

The first stage, second-stage and third-stage valves have dc motor operators. The stage 1/2/3 control valves are normally closed globe valves; the isolation valves are normally closed gate valves. The fourth-stage valves are interlocked so that they can not open until reactor coolant system pressure has been substantially reduced. The fourth stage control valves are squib valves. There is a normally open motor-operated gate valve in series with each squib valve.

The first three stages have a common inlet header connected to the top of the pressurizer. The outlet of the first to third stages then combine to a common discharge line to one of the spargers in the in-containment refueling water storage tank. There is a second identical group of first- to third-stage valves with its own inlet and outlet line and sparger.

The fourth-stage valves connect directly to the top of the reactor coolant hot leg and vent directly to the steam generator compartment. There are also two groups of fourth stage valves, with one group in each steam generator compartment.

The automatic depressurization valves are designed to automatically open when actuated and to remain open for the duration of an automatic depressurization event. Valve stages 1 and 4 actuate at discrete core makeup tank levels, as either tank's level decreases during injection or from spilling out a broken injection line. Valve stages 2 and 3 actuate based upon a timed delay after actuation of the preceding stage. This opening sequence provides a controlled depressurization of the reactor coolant system. The valve opening sequence prevents simultaneous opening of more than one stage, to allow the valves to sequentially open. The valve actuation logic is based on two-of-four level detectors, in either core makeup tank for automatic depressurization system stages 1 and 4.

The stage 1/2/3 automatic depressurization control valves are designed to open relatively slowly. During the actuation of each stage, the isolation valve is sequenced open before the control valve. Therefore, there is some time delay between stage actuation and control valve actuation.

The operators can manually open the first-stage valves to a partially open position to perform a controlled depressurization of the reactor coolant system. Additional information on the automatic depressurization valves is provided in subsection 5.4.6.

6.3.2.2.8.6 Low Differential Pressure Opening Check Valves

Several applications in the passive core cooling system gravity injection piping use check valves that open with low differential pressures. These check valves are installed in the following locations:

- The gravity injection line flow paths from the in-containment refueling water storage tank
- The containment recirculation lines that connect to the gravity injection lines

The check valves selected for these applications incorporate a simple swing-check design with a stainless steel body and hardened valve seats. The passive core cooling system check valves are safety-related, designed with their operating parts contained within the body, and with a low pressure drop across each valve. The valve internals are exposed to low temperature reactor coolant or borated refueling water.

During normal plant operation, these check valves are closed, with essentially no differential pressure across them. Confidence in the check valve operability is provided by operation at no differential pressure clean/cold fluid environment, the simple valve design, and the specified seat materials.

The check valves normally remain closed, except for testing or when called upon to open following an event to initiate passive core cooling system operation. The valves are not subject to the degradation from flow operation or impact loads caused by sudden flow reversal and seating, and they do not experience significant wear of the moving parts.

These check valves are periodically tested during shutdown conditions to demonstrate valve operation. These check valves are equipped with nonintrusive position sensors to indicate when the valves are open or closed.

In current plants, there are many applications of simple swing-check valves that have similar operating conditions to those in the passive core cooling system. The extensive operational history and experience derived from similar check valves used in the safety injection systems of current pressurized water reactors indicate that the design is reliable. Check valve failure to open and common mode failures have not been significant problems.

6.3.2.2.8.7 Accumulator Check Valves

The accumulator check valve design is similar to the accumulator check valves in current pressurized water reactor applications. It is also similar to the low differential pressure opening check valve design described in subsection 6.3.2.2.8.6. The accumulator check valves are diverse from the core makeup tank valves because they use different check valve types.

During normal operation, the check valves are in the closed position with a nominal differential pressure across the disc of about 1550 psid. The valves remain in this position, except for testing or when called upon to open following an event. They are not subject to the degradation from flow operation or impact loads caused by sudden flow reversal and seating. They do not experience significant wear of the moving parts and they are expected to function with minimal backleakage.

The accumulators can accept some inleakage from the reactor coolant system without affecting availability. Continuous inleakage requires that the accumulator water volume and boron concentration be adjusted periodically to meet technical specification requirements.

The AP1000 accumulator check valves are periodically tested during shutdown conditions to demonstrate their operation.

6.3.2.2.8.8 Relief Valves

Relief valves are installed for passive core cooling system accumulators to protect the tanks from overpressure.

The passive core cooling system piping is reviewed to identify those lengths of piping that are isolated by normally closed valves and that do not have pressure relief protection in the piping section between the valves.

These piping sections include:

- Portions of in-containment passive core cooling system test lines that are not passive core cooling system accident mitigation flow paths and are not needed to achieve safe shutdown
- Piping vents, drains, and test connections that typically have two closed valves or one closed valve and a blind flange
- Check valve test lines with sections isolated by two normally closed valves.

The piping vents, drains, test connections, and check valve lines have design pressure/temperature conditions compatible with the process piping to which they connect. Valve leakage does not overpressurize the isolated piping sections and pressure relief provisions are not required.

6.3.2.2.8.9 Explosively Opening (Squib) Valves

Squib valves are used in several passive core cooling system lines in order to provide the following:

- Zero leakage during normal operation
- Reliable opening during an accident
- Reduced maintenance and associated personnel radiation exposure

Squib valves are used to isolate the incontainment refueling water storage tank injection lines and the containment recirculation lines. In these applications, the squib valves are not expected to be opened during normal operation and anticipated transients. In addition, after they are opened it is not necessary that they re-close.

In the incontainment refueling water storage tank injection lines, the squib valves are in series with normally closed check valves. In the containment recirculation lines, the squib valves are in series with normally closed check valves in two lines and with normally open motor operated

valves in the other two lines. As a result, inadvertent opening of these squib valves will not result in loss of reactor coolant or in draining of the incontainment refueling water storage tank.

The type of squib valve used in these applications provides zero leakage in both directions. It also allows flow in both directions. A valve open position sensor is provided for these valves. The IRWST injection squib valves and the containment recirculation squib valves in series with check valves are diverse from the other containment recirculation squib valves. They are designed to different design pressures. The IRWST injection and the containment recirculation squib valves are qualified to operate after being submerged; this capability adds margin to the performance of the PXS in handling debris during long-term core cooling following a LOCA.

Squib valves are also used to isolate the fourth stage automatic depressurization system lines. These squib valves are in series with normally open motor operated gate valves. Actuation of these squib valves requires signals from two separate protection logic cabinets. This helps to prevent spurious opening of these squib valves. The type of squib valve used in this application provides zero leakage of reactor coolant out of the reactor coolant system. The reactor coolant pressure acts to open the valve. A valve open position sensor is provided for these valves.

6.3.2.3 Applicable Codes and Classifications

Sections 5.2 and 3.2 list the equipment ASME Code and seismic classification for the passive core cooling system. Most of the piping and components of the passive core cooling system within containment are AP1000 Equipment Class A, B, or C and are designed to meet seismic Category I requirements. Equipment Class C components and piping, that provide an emergency core cooling function, have augmented weld inspection requirements (see subsection 3.2.2.5). Some system piping and components that do not perform safety-related functions are nonsafety-related.

The requirements for the control, actuation, and Class 1E devices are presented in Chapters 7 and 8.

6.3.2.4 Material Specifications and Compatibility

Materials used for engineered safety feature components are given in Section 6.1. Materials for passive core cooling system components are selected to meet the applicable material requirements of the codes in Section 5.2, as well as the following additional requirements:

- Parts of components in contact with borated water are fabricated of, or clad with, austenitic stainless steel or an equivalent corrosion-resistant material.
- Internal parts of components in contact with containment emergency sump solution during recirculation are fabricated of austenitic stainless steel or an equivalent corrosion resistant material.
- Valve seating surfaces are hard-faced to prevent failure and to reduce wear.
- Valve stem materials are selected for their corrosion resistance, high-tensile properties, and their resistance to surface scoring by the packing.

Section 6.1 summarizes the materials used for passive core cooling system components.

6.3.2.5 System Reliability

The reliability of the passive core cooling system is considered including periodic testing of the components during plant operation. The passive core cooling system is a redundant, safety-related system. The system is designed to withstand credible single active or passive failures.

The initiating signals for the passive core cooling system are derived from independent sources as measured from process parameters (pressurizer low pressure) or environmental (containment high pressure) variables. Redundant, as well as functionally independent variables, are measured to initiate passive core cooling system operation.

Redundant passive core cooling system components are physically separated and protected so that a single event cannot initiate a common failure.

Power sources for the passive core cooling system are divided into four independent divisions that are supplied from the Class 1E dc and UPS system. Sufficient battery capacity is maintained to provide required power to the emergency loads when onsite and offsite ac power sources are not available. Section 8.3 provides additional information.

The preoperational testing program confirms that the systems, as designed and constructed meet the functional design requirements. Section 14.2 provides additional information. The passive core cooling system is designed with the capability for on-line testing of its active components so the availability and operation status can be readily determined. Testing of passive components such as check valves, tanks, heat exchanger, and flow paths can be conducted during shutdown conditions. In addition, the integrity of the passive core cooling system is verified through examination of critical components during the routine in-service inspection. Section 3.9.6 provides additional information.

The reliability assurance program described in Section 16.2, extends to the procurement of passive core cooling system components. The procurement quality assurance program is described in Chapter 17.

The passive core cooling system is a redundant, safety-related system. During the long-term cooling period following a loss of coolant accident, once the passive core cooling system equipment has actuated, there is no long-term maintenance required. Components actuate to the safeguards actuation alignment and do not need subsequent position changes for long-term operation.

For long-term cooling, the reactor coolant system is depressurized to containment ambient pressure following a loss of coolant accident. During this period, the heat generated in the reactor core is the residual decay heat and the passive core cooling system provides the required decay heat removal.

Proper initial filling and venting of the passive core cooling system prevents water hammer from occurring in the passive core cooling system lines. In addition, the head of water provided by the

various tanks keeps system lines full. The arrangement of the core makeup tank pressure equalization line design also reduces the potential for water hammer. High-point vents in the passive core cooling system lines are provided as a means for venting of lines. Fill and venting procedures for the passive core cooling system provide for the removal of air from the system.

The existence of high-point vents and the positive head of water provide means by which the operator can confirm water-solid passive core cooling system lines, where required.

6.3.2.5.1 Response to Active Failure

Treatment of active failures is described in Section 15.0.12.

An active failure is the failure of a powered component, a component of the electrical supply system, or instrumentation and control equipment to act on command to perform its function. One example is the failure of a motor-operated valve to move to its intended safeguards actuation position.

One change in the definition of active failures has been incorporated into the passive core cooling system design. The system has been specifically designed to treat check valve failures to reposition as active failures. More specifically, it is assumed that normally closed check valves may fail to open and normally open check valves may fail to close. Check valves that remain in the same position before and after an event are not considered active failures.

There are two exceptions to this treatment of check valve failures in the passive core cooling system. One exception is made for the accumulator check valves, which is consistent with the treatment of these specific check valves in currently licensed plant designs. The other exception is made for the core makeup tank check valves failure to re-open after they have closed during an accident. The valves are normally open, biased-opened check valves. This exception is based on the low probability of these check valves not re-opening within a few minutes after they have cycled closed during accumulator operation.

The failure mode and effects analysis provided in Table 6.3-3 provides a summary of the passive core cooling system response to single failure of the various components.

The following passive core cooling system motor-operated valves are not included in this analysis:

- Both accumulator discharge line motor-operated valves
- Both in-containment refueling water storage tank gravity injection line motor-operated valves
- Both containment recirculation line motor-operated valves
- Both core makeup tank inlet line motor-operated valves
- The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger inlet line motor-operated valve

These valves are normally in the required position for actuation of the associated component, they have redundant position indications and alarms, and they also receive confirmatory open actuation signals. The accumulator, incontainment refueling water storage tanks and passive residual heat removal heat exchanger valves have their power removed and locked out. The core makeup tank

and the containment recirculation line have redundant series controllers. Therefore, these valves are not considered in the failure modes and effects analysis.

The analysis illustrates that the passive core cooling system can sustain an active failure in either the short-term or long-term and meet the required level of performance for core cooling. The short-term operation of the active components of the passive core cooling system following a steam line rupture or a steam generator tube rupture is similar to that following a loss of coolant accident. The same analysis is applicable and the passive core cooling system can sustain the failure of a single active component and meet the level of performance for the addition of shutdown reactivity.

Portions of the passive core cooling system are also relied upon to provide boration and makeup during a safety-related shutdown. The passive core cooling system can sustain an active failure and perform the required functions necessary to establish safe shutdown conditions. Safe shutdown operation of the passive core cooling system is described in Section 7.4.

6.3.2.5.2 Response to Passive Failure

Treatment of passive failures is described in subsection 15.0.12.

A passive failure is the structural failure of a static component which limits the component's effectiveness in carrying out its design function. Examples include cracking of pipes, sprung flanges, or valve packing leaks. The passive core cooling system can sustain a single passive failure during the long-term phase and still retain an intact flow path to the core to supply sufficient flow to keep the core covered and to remove decay heat.

Since the passive core cooling system equipment is inside the containment, offsite dose caused by passive failures is not a concern. Also, with actuation of the automatic depressurization system, the reactor coolant system pressure is very close to containment pressure. Therefore, it is not necessary to isolate or realign the passive core cooling system following a passive failure.

The passive core cooling system flow paths are separated into redundant lines, either of which can provide minimum core cooling functions and return spilled water from the floor of the containment back to the reactor coolant system. For the long-term passive core cooling system function, adequate core cooling capacity exists with one of the two redundant flow paths.

6.3.2.5.3 Lag Times

Lag times for initiation and operation of the passive core cooling system are controlled by repositioning of valves. Some valves are normally in the position required for safety-related system function and therefore, their valve operation times are not considered. For those valves that reposition to initiate safety-related system functions, the valve repositioning times are less than the times assumed in the accident analyses. These lag times refer to the time after initiation of the safeguards actuation signal.

It is acceptable for the core makeup tank injection to be delayed several minutes following actuation due to high initial steam condensation rates in the tank.

6.3.2.5.4 Potential Boron Precipitation

Boron precipitation in the reactor vessel is prevented by sufficient flow of passive core cooling system water through the core to limit the increase in boron concentration of the water remaining in the reactor vessel. Water along with steam leaves the core and exits the RCS through the fourth stage ADS lines. These valves connect to the hot leg and open in about 20 minutes after a loss of coolant accident or an automatic depressurization system actuation.

6.3.2.5.5 Safe Shutdown

During a safe shutdown, the passive core cooling system provides redundancy for boration, makeup, and heat removal functions. Section 7.4 provides additional information about safe shutdown.

6.3.2.6 Protection Provisions

The measures taken to protect the system from damage that might result from various events are described in other sections, as listed below.

- Protection from dynamic effects is presented in Section 3.6.
- Protection from missiles is presented in Section 3.5.
- Protection from seismic damage is presented in Sections 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
- Protection from fire is presented subsection 9.5.1.
- Environmental qualification of equipment is presented in Section 3.11.
- Thermal stresses on the reactor coolant system are presented in Section 5.2.

6.3.2.7 Provisions for Performance Testing

The passive core cooling system includes the capability for determination of the integrity of the pressure boundary formed by series passive core cooling system check valves. Additional information on testing can be found in subsection 6.3.6.

6.3.2.8 Manual Actions

The passive core cooling system is automatically actuated for those events as presented in subsection 6.3.3. Following actuation, the passive core cooling system continues to operate in the injection mode until the transition to recirculation initiates automatically following containment floodup.

Although the passive core cooling system operates automatically, operator actions would be beneficial, in some cases, in reducing the consequences of an event. For example, in a steam generator tube rupture with no operator action, the protection and safety monitoring system automatically terminates the leak, prevents steam generator overfill, and limits the offsite doses. However, the operator can initiate actions, similar to those taken in current plants, to identify and

isolate the faulted steam generator, cool down and depressurize the reactor coolant system to terminate the break flow to the steam generator, and stabilize plant conditions.

Section 7.5 describes the post-accident monitoring instrumentation available to the operator in the main control room following an event.

6.3.3 Performance Evaluation

The events described in subsection 6.3.1 result in passive core cooling system actuation and are mitigated within the performance criteria. For the purpose of evaluation in Chapters 15 and 19, the events that result in passive core cooling system actuation are categorized as follows:

- A. Increase in heat removal by the secondary system
 - 1. Inadvertent opening of a steam generator power-operated atmospheric steam relief or safety valve
 - 2. Steam system piping failure
- B. Decrease in heat removal by the secondary system
 - 1. Loss of Main Feedwater Flow
 - 2. Feedwater system piping failure
- C. Decrease in reactor coolant system inventory
 - 1. Steam generator tube rupture
 - 2. Loss of coolant accident from a spectrum of postulated reactor coolant system piping failures
 - 3. Loss of coolant due to a rod cluster control assembly ejection accident
(This event is enveloped by the reactor coolant system piping failures.)
- D. Shutdown Events (Chapter 19)
 - 1. Loss of Startup Feedwater
 - 2. Loss of normal residual heat removal system with reactor coolant system pressure boundary intact
 - 3. Loss of normal residual heat removal system during mid-loop operation
 - 4. Loss of normal residual heat removal system with refueling cavity flooded

The events listed in groups A and B are non-LOCA events where the primary protection is provided by the passive core cooling system passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. For these events, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is actuated by the protection and monitoring system for the following conditions:

- Steam generator low narrow range level, coincident with startup feedwater low flow
- Steam generator low wide range level
- Core makeup tank actuation
- Automatic depressurization actuation
- Pressurizer water level - High 3
- Manual actuation

The events listed in group C above are events involving the loss of reactor coolant where the primary protection is by the core makeup tanks and accumulators. For these events the core makeup tanks are actuated by the protection and monitoring system for the following conditions:

- Pressurizer low pressure
- Pressurizer low level
- Steam line low pressure
- Containment high pressure
- Cold leg low temperature
- Steam generator low wide range level, coincident with reactor coolant system high hot leg temperature
- Manual actuation

In addition to initiating passive core cooling system operation, these signals initiate other safeguards automatic actions including reactor trip, reactor coolant pump trip, feedwater isolation, and containment isolation. The passive core cooling system actuation signals are described in Section 7.3.

The core makeup tanks and passive residual heat removal heat exchangers are also actuated by the Diverse Actuation System as described in subsection 7.7.1.11.

Upon receipt of an actuation signal, the actions described in subsection 6.3.2.1 are automatically initiated to align the appropriate features of the passive core cooling system.

For non-LOCA events, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is actuated so that it can remove core decay heat.

For loss of coolant accidents, the core makeup tanks deliver borated water to the reactor coolant system via the direct vessel injection nozzles. The accumulators deliver flow to the direct vessel

injection line whenever reactor coolant system pressure drops below the tank static pressure. The in-containment refueling water storage tank provides gravity injection once the reactor coolant system pressure is reduced to below the injection head from the in-containment refueling water storage tank. The passive core cooling system flow rates vary depending upon the type of event and its characteristic pressure transient.

As the core makeup tanks drain down, the automatic depressurization system valves are sequentially actuated. The depressurization sequence establishes reactor coolant pressure conditions that allow injection from the accumulators, and then from the in-containment refueling water storage tank and the containment recirculation path. Therefore, an injection source is continually available.

The events listed in group D occur during shutdown conditions that are characterized by slow plant responses and mild thermal-hydraulic transients. In addition, some of the passive core cooling system features need to be isolated to allow the plant to be in these conditions or to perform maintenance on the system. The protection and monitoring system automatically actuates gravity injection from the IRWST to provide core cooling during shutdown conditions prior to refueling cavity floodup. In addition, the operator can also manually actuate other passive core cooling system equipment, such as the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, to provide core cooling during shutdown conditions when the equipment does not automatically actuate.

6.3.3.1 Increase in Heat Removal by the Secondary System

A number of events that could result in an increase in heat removal from the reactor coolant system by the secondary system have been postulated. For each event, consideration has been given to operation of nonsafety-related systems that could affect the event results. The operation of the startup feedwater system and the chemical and volume control system makeup pumps can affect these events. Analyses of these events, both with and without these nonsafety-related systems operating, are presented in Section 15.1. For those events resulting in passive core cooling system actuation, the following summarizes passive core cooling system performance.

6.3.3.1.1 Inadvertent Opening of a Steam Generator Relief or Safety Valve

Subsection 15.1.4 provides a description of an inadvertent opening of a steam generator relief or safety valve, including criteria and analytical results.

For this event, upon generation of a safeguards actuation signal the reactor is tripped, the core makeup tanks are actuated, and the reactor coolant pumps are tripped. Since the core makeup tanks are actuated, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is also actuated. The main steam lines are also isolated to prevent blowdown of more than one steam generator. The core makeup tanks operate with water recirculation injection to provide borated water to the reactor vessel downcomer plenum for reactor coolant system inventory and reactivity control. The trip of the reactor initially brings the reactor sub-critical. The rapid reactor coolant system cool down may result in the reactor returning to critical because the rate of positive reactivity addition (reactor coolant system temperature reduction) exceeds the rate of negative reactivity addition (boron from the core makeup tank). As the event continues, the reactor coolant system cooldown will slow

down such that the continued core makeup tank boration will return the reactor sub-critical. The departure from nucleate boiling design basis is met, thereby preventing fuel damage.

During this event, the startup feedwater system is assumed to malfunction so that it injects water at the maximum flow rate. This injection continues until feedwater isolation occurs on low reactor coolant system temperature. The feedwater isolation signal terminates the feedwater addition from the startup feedwater system. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is also assumed to function in this event. This heat removal mechanism continues throughout the duration of the event.

For this event, the core makeup tanks operate in the water recirculation mode, providing boration and injection flow without draining. Therefore, the automatic depressurization system is not actuated on the lowering of the core makeup tank level.

Subsequent to stabilizing plant conditions and satisfying passive core cooling system termination criteria, the operator terminates passive core cooling system operation and initiates normal plant shutdown operations.

6.3.3.1.2 Steam System Pipe Failure

The most severe core conditions resulting from a steam system piping failure are associated with a double-ended rupture of a main steam line, occurring at zero power. Effects of smaller piping failures at higher power levels are bounded by the double-ended rupture at zero power. Subsection 15.1.5 provides a description of this event, including criteria and analytical results.

For this event, the passive core cooling system functions as described in subsection 6.3.3.1.1 for the inadvertent opening of a steam generator relief or safety valve. However, this piping failure constitutes a more severe cooldown transient. The malfunctioning of the startup feedwater system is considered as it was in the inadvertent steam generator depressurization. The trip of the reactor initially brings the reactor sub-critical. The rapid reactor coolant system cool down may result in the reactor returning to critical because the rate of positive reactivity addition (reactor coolant system temperature reduction) exceeds the rate of negative reactivity addition (boron from the core makeup tank). As the event continues, the reactor coolant system cooldown will slow down such that the continued core makeup tank boration will return the reactor sub-critical. The departure from nucleate boiling design basis is met.

For this event, the reactor coolant system may depressurize sufficiently to permit the accumulators to deliver makeup water to the reactor coolant system. The core makeup tanks inject via water recirculation without draining. Therefore, the automatic depressurization system is not actuated on the lowering of the core makeup tank level. Subsequent to stabilizing plant conditions and satisfying passive core cooling system termination criteria, the operator terminates passive core cooling system operation and initiates a normal plant shutdown.

6.3.3.2 Decrease in Heat Removal by the Secondary System

A number of events have been postulated that could result in a decrease in heat removal from the reactor coolant system by the secondary system. For each event, consideration has been given to

operation of nonsafety-related systems that could affect the consequences of an event. The operation of the startup feedwater system and the chemical and volume control system makeup pumps can affect these events. Analyses of these events, both with and without these nonsafety-related systems operating, are presented in Section 15.2. For those events resulting in passive core cooling system actuation, the following summarizes passive core cooling system performance.

6.3.3.2.1 Loss of Main Feedwater

The most severe core conditions resulting from a loss of main feedwater system flow are associated with a loss of flow at full power. The heat-up transient effects of loss of flow at reduced power levels are bounded by the loss of flow at full power. Subsection 15.2.7 provides a description of this event, including criteria and analytical results.

For this event, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is actuated. If the core makeup tanks are not initially actuated, they actuate later when passive residual heat exchanger cooling sufficiently reduces pressurizer level. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger serves to remove core decay heat and the core makeup tanks inject a borated water solution directly into the reactor vessel downcomer annulus. Since the reactor coolant pumps are tripped on actuation of the core makeup tanks, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger operates under natural circulation conditions. The core makeup tanks operate via water recirculation, without draining, to maintain reactor coolant system inventory. Therefore, the automatic depressurization system is not actuated on the lowering of the core makeup tank level. Since the event is characterized by a heat-up transient, the injection of negative reactivity is not required and is not taken credit for in the analysis to control core reactivity.

The reactor coolant system does not depressurize to permit the accumulators to deliver makeup water to the reactor coolant system. Subsequent to stabilizing plant conditions and satisfying passive core cooling system termination criteria, the operator terminates passive core cooling system operation and initiates a normal plant shutdown.

6.3.3.2.2 Feedwater System Pipe Failure

The most severe core conditions resulting from a feedwater system piping failure are associated with a double-ended rupture of a feed line at full power. Depending on break size and power level, a feedwater system pipe failure could cause either a reactor coolant system cooldown transient or a reactor coolant system heat-up transient. Only the reactor coolant system heat-up transient is evaluated as a feedwater system pipe failure, since the spectrum of cooldown transients is bounded by the steam system pipe failure analyses. The heat-up transient effects of smaller piping failures at reduced power levels are bounded by the double-ended feed line rupture at full power. Subsection 15.2.8 provides a description of this event, including criteria and analytical results.

For this event, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger and the core makeup tanks are actuated. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger serves to remove core decay heat, and the core makeup tanks inject a borated water solution directly into the reactor vessel downcomer. Since the reactor coolant pumps are tripped on actuation of the core makeup tanks, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger operates under natural circulation conditions. The core makeup tanks operate via water recirculation to maintain reactor coolant system inventory. Since

the event is characterized by a heat-up transient, the injection of negative reactivity is not required and is not taken credit for in the analysis to control core reactivity.

The reactor coolant system does not depressurize to permit the accumulators to deliver makeup water to the reactor coolant system. Subsequent to stabilizing plant conditions and satisfying passive core cooling system termination criteria, the operator terminates passive core cooling system operation and initiates normal plant shutdown operations.

6.3.3.3 Decrease in Reactor Coolant System Inventory

A number of events have been postulated that could result in a decrease in reactor coolant system inventory. For each event, consideration has been given to operation of nonsafety-related systems that could affect the consequences of the event. The operation of the startup feedwater system and the chemical and volume control system makeup pumps can affect these events. Analyses of these events, both with and without these nonsafety-related systems operating, are presented in Section 15.6. For those events which result in passive core cooling system actuation, the following summarizes passive core cooling system performance.

6.3.3.3.1 Steam Generator Tube Rupture

Although a steam generator tube rupture is an event that results in a decrease in reactor coolant system inventory, severe core conditions do not result from a steam generator tube rupture. The event analyzed is a complete severance of a single steam generator tube that occurs at power with the reactor coolant contaminated with fission products, corresponding to continuous operation with a limited amount of defective fuel rods. Effects of smaller breaks are bounded by the complete severance. Subsection 15.6.3 provides a description of this event, including criteria and analytical results.

For this event, the nonsafety-related makeup pumps are automatically actuated when reactor coolant system inventory decreases and a reactor trip occurs, followed by actuation of the startup feedwater pumps. The startup feedwater flow initiates on low steam generator level following the reactor trip and automatically throttles feedwater flow to maintain programmed steam generator level, limiting overfill of the faulted steam generator. The makeup pumps automatically function to maintain the programmed pressurizer level. The operators are expected to take actions similar to those in current plants to identify and isolate the faulted steam generator, cooldown and depressurize the reactor coolant system to terminate the break flow into the steam generator, and stabilize plant conditions.

If the operator fails to take timely or correct actions in response to the leak, or if the makeup pumps and/or the startup feedwater pumps malfunction with excessive flow, then the water level in the faulted steam generator continues to increase. This actuates safety-related overfill protection and automatically isolates the startup feedwater pumps and the chemical and volume control system makeup pumps. The core makeup tanks subsequently actuate on low pressurizer level, if they are not already actuated. Actuation of the core makeup tanks automatically actuates the passive residual heat removal system heat exchanger.

The core makeup tanks operate via water recirculation to provide borated water directly into the reactor vessel downcomer to maintain reactor coolant system inventory. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger serves to remove core decay heat. Since the reactor coolant pumps are automatically tripped on actuation of the core makeup tanks, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger operates under natural circulation flow conditions. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, in conjunction with the core makeup tanks, remove core decay heat and reduce reactor coolant system temperature. As the reactor coolant system cools and the inventory contracts, pressurizer level and pressure decrease, equalizing with steam generator pressure and terminating break flow.

If the nonsafety-related systems fail to start, the core makeup tanks and the passive residual heat removal heat exchangers automatically actuate. Their response is similar to that previously described, except that the faulted steam generator level is lower.

In these events, the plant conditions are stabilized without actuating the automatic depressurization system. Once plant conditions are stable, the operator completes a normal plant shutdown.

6.3.3.3.2 Loss of Coolant Accident

A loss of coolant accident is a rupture of the reactor coolant system piping or branch piping that results in a decrease in reactor coolant system inventory that exceeds the flow capability of the normal makeup system. Ruptures resulting in break flow within the capability of the normal makeup system do not result in decreasing reactor coolant system pressure and actuation of the passive core cooling system. The maximum break size for which the normal makeup system can maintain reactor coolant system pressure is obtained by comparing the calculated flow from the reactor coolant system through the postulated break with the charging pump makeup flow at a reactor coolant system pressure that is above the low pressure safeguards actuation setpoint. The makeup flow rate from one makeup pump is adequate to maintain pressurizer pressure for a break through a 0.375-inch diameter hole. Therefore, the normal makeup system can maintain reactor coolant system pressure and permit the operator to execute an orderly shutdown.

For the purpose of evaluation, the spectrum of postulated piping breaks in the reactor coolant system is divided into major pipe breaks (large break) and minor pipe breaks (small breaks). The large break is a rupture with a total cross-sectional area equal to or greater than one square foot. The small break is defined as a rupture with a total cross-sectional area less than one square foot. Section 15.6 provides a description of this event, including criteria and analytical results.

For either event, the core makeup tanks are actuated upon receipt of a safeguards actuation signal. These tanks provide high-pressure injection. For large breaks, or after the automatic depressurization system is actuated, the accumulators also provide injection. After automatic depressurization system actuation, the in-containment refueling water storage tank, and the containment recirculation sump, provide low pressure injection.

The core makeup tanks can operate via water recirculation or steam-compensated injection during LOCAs. For smaller loss of coolant accidents, the reactor coolant system inventory is sufficient to establish water recirculation. For larger break sizes, when the pressurizer empties and voiding

occurs in the cold legs steam-compensated injection initiates. When the cold legs void, the core makeup tank flow increases.

As the core makeup tanks drain, their level sequences the automatic depressurization system valve stages. As the level drops in the core makeup tank, the first-stage actuates. The first-stage valves are connected to the top of the pressurizer and discharge to the in-containment refueling water storage tank via the automatic depressurization system spargers. After a time delay, the second-stage is actuated. The second stage valves are connected with the same flow path as the first-stage valves. After an additional time delay, the third-stage is actuated. The third stage valves are identical to the second-stage valves. As the core makeup tank drops to a low level the fourth-stage is actuated. The fourth stage valves are connected to both hot legs and they discharge directly to the reactor coolant system loop compartments at an elevation just above the maximum containment floodup level.

The in-containment refueling water storage tank line squib valves are opened on the fourth stage actuation signal. Check valves arranged in series with the squib valves remain closed until the reactor depressurizes. After depressurization, the in-containment refueling water storage tank provides injection flow. The flow continues until containment floodup initiates containment recirculation.

For large breaks or following automatic depressurization system initiation, the accumulators provide rapid injection to the reactor vessel through the same connections used by the core makeup tanks and the in-containment refueling water storage tank injection. The accumulators begin to inject when the reactor coolant system depressurizes to about 700 psig. During the loss of coolant accident transient, flow to the reactor coolant system is dependent on the reactor coolant system pressure transient. The passive core cooling system water injected into the reactor coolant system provides for heat transfer from the core, prevents excessive core clad temperatures, and refloods the core (for large loss of coolant accidents) or keeps the core covered (for small loss of coolant accidents).

For small loss of coolant accidents, the control rods provide the initial core shutdown and the boron in the passive core cooling system tanks add negative reactivity to provide adequate shutdown at low temperatures.

Following the initial thermal-hydraulic transient for a loss of coolant accident event, the passive core cooling system continues to supply water to the reactor coolant system for long-term cooling. When the water level in the in-containment refueling water storage tank drops to a low-low level, the water level in the containment has increased to a sufficient level to provide recirculation flow. The in-containment refueling water storage tank low-low level signal opens the squib valves in the lines between the containment and the gravity injection line. Initially, some of the water remaining in the tank drains to the containment until the water levels equalize. During this drain, injection to the core continues. The redundant flow paths provide continued cooling of the core by recirculation of the water in the containment. Figure 6.3-3 provides process flow information illustrating passive core cooling system performance for the various modes of system operation.

6.3.3.3 Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Tube Rupture

Although a passive residual heat removal heat exchanger tube rupture is an event that results in a decrease in reactor coolant system inventory, severe core conditions do not result from this event. There is a spectrum of heat exchanger tube leak sizes that are possible. For a small initiating leak, the passive core cooling system temperature instrumentation for the heat exchanger is used to identify that this is a heat exchanger leak. If the leak rate is less than the Technical Specification limits, plant operation can continue indefinitely. If the leak rate exceeds the Technical Specification limits the plant would be shut down to repair the heat exchanger.

If a severe tube leak occurs, the operators can use available instrumentation to identify the leak source. Action can then be taken to remotely isolate the heat exchanger by closing the motor-operated inlet isolation valve, which is normally open. The plant would be shut down to repair the heat exchanger.

This event is addressed in Section 15.6.

6.3.3.4 Shutdown Events

The passive core cooling system components are available whenever the reactor is critical and when reactor coolant energy is sufficiently high to require passive safety injection. During low-temperature physics testing, the core decay heat levels are low and there is a negligible amount of stored energy in the reactor coolant. Therefore, an event comparable in severity to events occurring at operating conditions is not possible and passive core cooling system equipment is not required. The possibility of a loss of coolant accident during plant startup and shutdown has been considered.

During shutdown conditions, some of the passive core cooling system equipment is isolated. In addition, since the normal residual heat removal system is not a safety-related system, its loss is considered.

As a result, gravity injection is automatically actuated when required during shutdown conditions prior to refueling cavity floodup, as discussed in subsection 6.3.3.3.2. The operator can also manually actuate other passive core cooling system equipment, such as the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, if required for accident mitigation during shutdown conditions when the equipment does not automatically actuate.

6.3.3.4.1 Loss of Startup Feedwater During Hot Standby, Cooldowns, and Heat-ups

During normal cooldowns, the steam generators are supplied by the startup feedwater pumps and steam from the steam generator is directed to either the main condenser or to the atmosphere. There are two nonsafety-related startup feedwater pumps, each of which is capable of providing sufficient feedwater flow to both steam generators to remove decay heat. These pumps are also automatically loaded on the nonsafety-related diesel-generators in the event offsite power is lost. Since these pumps are nonsafety-related, their failure is considered.

In the event of a loss of startup feedwater, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is automatically actuated on low steam generator water level and provides safety-related heat removal. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger can maintain the reactor coolant system temperature, as well as provide for reactor coolant system cooldown to conditions where the normal residual heat removal system can be operated.

Since the chemical and volume control system makeup pumps are nonsafety-related, they may not be available. In this case, the core makeup tanks automatically actuate as the cooldown continues and the pressurizer level decreases. The core makeup tanks operate in a water recirculation mode to maintain reactor coolant system inventory while the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is operating.

The in-containment refueling water storage tank provides the heat sink for the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. Initially, the heat addition increases the water temperature. Within one to two hours, the water reaches saturation temperature and begins to boil. The steam generated in the in-containment refueling water storage tank discharges to containment. Because the containment integrity is maintained during cooldown Modes 3 and 4, the passive containment cooling system provides the safety-related ultimate heat sink. Therefore, most of the steam generated in the in-containment refueling water storage tank is condensed on the inside of the containment vessel and drains back into the in-containment refueling water storage tank via the condensate return gutter arrangement. This allows it to indefinitely function as a heat sink.

6.3.3.4.2 Loss of Normal Residual Heat Removal Cooling With The Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Intact

During normal shutdown conditions, the normal residual heat removal system is placed into service at about 350°F to accomplish reactor coolant system cooldown to refueling temperatures. The normal residual heat removal system piping is safety-related and meets seismic Category I requirements to prevent pipe breaks that could result in a significant loss of reactor coolant during system operation. The pump motors and the electrical power supplies are nonsafety-related.

The system is designed so that with single failure of an active system component, it can maintain the plant in a hot shutdown condition (<350°F). It is also possible to perform a reactor coolant system cooldown, but at a slower rate than with full system capability. Heat removed by the normal residual heat removal system is transferred to the component cooling water system and then to the service water system. The heat removal path is powered by the nonsafety-related diesel-generators in the event that offsite power is lost.

Since the normal residual heat removal pumps are nonsafety-related, they may not be available. In this case, the reactor coolant system pressure boundary remains intact and the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger provides the safety-related heat removal flow path.

The normal residual heat removal system is operated once the reactor coolant system temperature is too low to support sufficient steam production for decay heat removal. With a loss of shutdown cooling, the reactor coolant system temperature does not increase sufficiently to initiate steam generator steaming and to reduce steam generator level. This is because the steam generators are normally filled, with a nitrogen purge established, during shutdown conditions. The loss of

cooling would result in the heat up of the reactor coolant system and a pressure increase resulting in the normal residual heat removal system relief valve opening. This loss of fluid would result in a decrease in the pressurizer level; which a low pressurizer level signal automatically actuates the core make tanks and the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger could also be manually actuated.

The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is capable of functioning at low reactor coolant system temperatures and pressures, but it may not be able to maintain the initial reactor coolant system temperature. It can remove sufficient heat to maintain the reactor coolant system within the normal residual heat removal system design limits (400°F). This permits the normal residual heat removal system to be placed back in operation when it becomes available.

For this event, the reactor coolant system temperature is expected to increase and expand into the pressurizer. Reactor coolant system injection should not be required. The makeup pumps are aligned for automatic operation in the event that pressurizer level decreases, due to leakage. However, since they are nonsafety-related, they are considered unavailable for reactor coolant system makeup. Therefore should safety-related makeup be required, the core makeup tanks would automatically actuate and operate via water recirculation injection. For some scenarios, the core makeup tanks could drain down and actuate the automatic depressurization system valves. This would lead to injection via the in-containment refueling water storage tank and containment recirculation paths.

6.3.3.4.3 Loss of Normal Residual Heat Removal Cooling During Reduced Inventory

During reactor coolant system maintenance, the most limiting shutdown condition anticipated is with the reactor coolant level reduced and the reactor coolant system pressure boundary opened. It is normal practice to open the steam generator channel head manway covers to install the hot leg and cold leg nozzle dams during a refueling outage. In this situation, the normal residual heat removal system is used to cool the reactor coolant system. The AP1000 incorporates many features to reduce the probability of losing the normal residual heat removal system. However, since the normal residual heat removal system is nonsafety-related, its failure has been considered. The normal residual heat removal system is described subsection 5.4.7.

In reduced inventory operation with the reactor coolant system depressurized and the pressure boundary opened, the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is unable to remove the decay heat because the reactor coolant system cannot heat sufficiently above the in-containment refueling water storage tank temperature.

In this situation, core cooling is provided by the safety-related passive core cooling system, using gravity injection from the in-containment refueling water storage tank, while venting through the automatic depressurization system valves (and possibly through other openings in the reactor coolant system).

Prior to draining the reactor coolant system inventory below the no-load pressurizer level, the core makeup tanks are isolated to preclude inadvertent draining into the reactor coolant system while preparing for midloop operation. During plant shutdown, at 1000 psig, the accumulators are isolated to prevent inadvertent injection. In this configuration, the core makeup tanks and

accumulators are isolated from the reactor coolant system, however these valves can be remotely opened with operator action to provide additional makeup water injection, if required.

Before the core makeup tanks are isolated, the automatic depressurization first-, second-, and third-stages valves are opened manually by the operators. The automatic depressurization system first-, second- and third-stage valves are required to remain open whenever the reactor coolant inventory is reduced or the upper core internals are in place. During an extended loss of normal residual heat removal system operation the stage one, two and three vent paths may not provide sufficient vent capability to allow gravity injection of water from the in-containment refueling water storage tank because of pressurizer surge line flooding. As a result, two of the automatic depressurization stage four paths are required to be operable in these conditions. The stage four valves are automatically opened by a signal from the protection and monitoring system on a low hot leg level signal following a time delay.

The in-containment refueling water storage tank injection squib valves automatically open via the same low hot leg level signal that opens the automatic depressurization stage four valves. The operators can also open these injection and depressurization valves via the diverse actuation system. Once these valves open, injection from the in-containment refueling water storage tank provides gravity injection for core cooling. When the in-containment refueling water storage tank level drops to a low level, the squib valves in the containment recirculation line automatically open. This action initiates containment recirculation flow, with flow passing through the in-containment refueling water storage tank gravity injection lines, which provides long-term core cooling.

This arrangement provides automatic core cooling protection, while in reduced inventory operation while also providing protection (an evacuation alarm and sufficient time to evacuate) for maintenance personnel in containment during midloop operation. The time delay also provides the operators with time to take actions to restore nonsafety-related decay heat removal prior to actuating the passive core cooling system.

During reduced inventory conditions the capability of closing the containment is required. After the containment is closed, containment recirculation can continue indefinitely, with the decay heat generating steam which condenses on the containment vessel and drains back into the in-containment refueling water storage tank.

6.3.3.4.4 Loss of Normal Residual Heat Removal Cooling During Refueling

The normal residual heat removal system is normally used for decay heat removal during refueling operation. Its failure is considered because it is not a safety-related system. In this case, it is assumed that the reactor vessel head is removed and the water from the in-containment refueling water storage tank has been transferred to the refueling cavity, which is flooded to its high level condition. The passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is not available and containment integrity is expected to be relaxed with air locks and/or equipment hatches open.

Assuming that the refueling cavity was just flooded when the normal residual heat removal system fails, the refueling cavity water heats up to saturation temperature in about nine hours. With the slow heat-up of the refueling cavity water, there is ample time to close containment before

significant steaming to the containment begins. The Technical Specifications require that containment closure capability be maintained during refueling MODES such that closure of the containment can be assumed. With the containment closed, water will not be lost from containment and long-term cooling can be maintained without subsequent need for cooling water makeup. Without closing the containment, boiling would reduce the water level to the top of the fuel assemblies in about five days.

6.3.4 Post-72 Hour Actions

The AP1000 passive core cooling system design includes safety-related equipment that is sufficient to automatically establish and maintain safe shutdown conditions for the plant following design basis events. The passive core cooling system can maintain safe shutdown conditions for 72 hours after an event without operator action and without both nonsafety-related onsite and offsite power.

There is only one action that may be required to provide long-term core cooling. There is a potential need for containment inventory makeup. The need for makeup to containment is directly related to the leakrate from the containment. With the maximum allowable containment leakrate, makeup to containment is not needed for about one month. A safety-related connection is available in the normal residual heat removal system to align a temporary makeup source to containment.

6.3.5 Limits on System Parameters

The analyses show that the design basis performance of the passive core cooling system is sufficient to meet the core cooling requirements following an event, with the minimum engineered safety features equipment operating. To provide this capability in the event of the single failure of components, technical specifications are established for reactor operation. The technical specifications are provided in Chapter 16.

The passive core cooling system equipment is not required to operate to support either normal power operation or shutdown operation of the plant. This reduces the probability that the passive core cooling system equipment is unavailable due to maintenance. Planned maintenance on the passive core cooling system equipment is accomplished during shutdown operations when the core temperatures are low, decay heat levels are low, and the Technical Specifications do not require availability of the equipment.

The principal system parameters and the number of components that may be out of operation during testing, quantities and concentrations of coolant available, and allowable time for operation in a degraded status are provided in the technical specifications.

If efforts to restore the operable status of the passive core cooling system equipment are not accomplished within technical specification requirements, the plant is required to be placed in a lower operational mode.

6.3.6 Inspection and Testing Requirements**6.3.6.1 Preoperational Inspection and Testing**

Preoperational inspections and tests of the passive core cooling system are performed to verify the operability of the system prior to loading fuel. This testing includes valve inspection and testing, flow testing, and verification of heat removal capability.

Preoperational testing of the passive core cooling system is completed in conjunction with testing of the reactor coolant system following flushing and hydrostatic testing, with the system cold and the reactor vessel head removed. The passive core cooling system is aligned for normal power operation. This testing provides the following information:

- Satisfactory safeguards actuation signal generation and transmission
- Valve operating times
- Injection starting times
- Injection delivery rates

The preoperational testing program includes testing of the following passive core cooling system components:

- Core makeup tanks
- Accumulators
- In-containment refueling water storage tank
- Containment recirculation
- Passive residual heat removal heat exchanger

Conformance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.79 is described in subsection 1.9.1. Preoperational testing of the passive core cooling system is conducted in accordance with the requirements presented in subsection 14.2.9.1.3.

6.3.6.1.1 Flow Testing

Initial verification of the resistance of the passive core cooling injection lines is performed by conducting a series of flow tests for the core makeup tanks, accumulators, in-containment refueling water storage tank, and containment recirculation piping. The calculated flow resistances are bounded by the resistances used in the Chapter 15 safety analyses.

6.3.6.1.2 Heat Transfer Testing

Initial verification of the heat transfer capability of the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger is performed by conducting a natural circulation test. This test is conducted during hot functional testing of the reactor coolant system. Measurements of heat exchanger flow rate and inlet and outlet temperatures are recorded, and calculations are performed to verify that the heat transfer performance of the heat exchanger is greater than that provided in Table 6.3-2.

6.3.6.1.3 Preoperational Inspections

Preoperational inspections are performed to verify that important elevations associated with the passive core cooling system components are consistent with the accident analyses presented in Chapter 15. The following elevations are verified:

- The bottom inside surface of each core makeup tank is at least 7.5 feet above the direct vessel injection nozzle centerline.
- The bottom inside surface of the in-containment refueling water storage tank is at least 3.4 feet above the direct vessel injection nozzle centerline.
- The centerline of the upper passive residual heat removal heat exchanger channel head is at least 26.3 feet above the hot leg centerline.
- The pH baskets are located below plant elevation 107 feet, 2 inches.

Inspections of the passive core cooling system tanks and pH adjustment baskets are conducted to verify that the actual tank volumes are greater than or equal to volume assumed in the Chapter 15 accident analyses. Inspections to determine dimensions of the core makeup tanks, accumulators, in-containment refueling water storage tank, and pH adjustment baskets are conducted, and calculations are performed to verify that actual volume is not less than the corresponding minimum required volume listed in Table 6.3-2.

6.3.6.2 In-Service Testing and Inspection

In-service testing and inspection of the passive core cooling system components and the associated support systems are planned. The passive core cooling system components and systems are designed to meet the intent of the ASME Operations and Maintenance (OM) Code, for in-service testing. A description of the in-service testing program is provided in subsection 3.9.6.

Two basic types of in-service testing are performed on the passive core cooling system components:

- Periodic exercise testing of active components during power operation (for example, cycling of specific valves)
- Operability testing of specific passive core cooling system features during plant shutdown (for example, accumulator injection flow to the reactor vessel or leak testing of containment isolation valves during selected plant shutdown).

The passive core cooling system includes specific features to support in-service test performance:

- Remotely operated valves can be exercised during routine plant maintenance
- Level, pressure, flow, and valve position instrumentation is provided for monitoring required passive core cooling system equipment during plant operation and testing

- Permanently installed test lines and connections are provided for operability testing

6.3.6.3 Mitigation of Gas Accumulation

Periodic system surveillance and venting procedures, in addition to specific design features, are implemented that aim to prevent gas accumulation and minimize or eliminate gas whenever found. Locations identified by the gas accumulation assessment have been equipped with manual vent valves or continuously monitored and alarmed pipe stubs with manual vent valves. These locations are specified within the periodic system surveillance and venting procedures as locations of high importance. Locations outfitted with pipe stub collection and alarm features have Technical Specifications including Surveillance Requirements to continuously monitor for gas accumulation and Required Actions subsequent to identifying gas accumulation in those locations to vent the identified gas accumulation. Plant startup and operational procedures include venting and surveillance steps that provide a means to track and trend accumulated gas such that problem areas can be systematically identified, monitored, and corrected.

6.3.6.3.1 System Gas Accumulation Assessment

Reviews of pipe layout and routing drawings to identify high-point vent and low-point drain locations are included as part of system design finalization activities. This existing design activity was expanded for the AP1000 passive safety systems, to integrate the draft Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) document ISG-019 regarding gas intrusion assessment guidance into the design process, helping to confirm that the potential issues identified in Generic Letter 2008-01 have been addressed within the design. Westinghouse also performed a comprehensive assessment for gas intrusion within the passive safety systems, consistent with the methodology in NEI 09-10 as applied in current operating plants, and consistent with the additional guidance in the ISG.

6.3.6.3.2 System Design Features to Mitigate Gas Intrusion

The gas intrusion assessment described in subsection 6.3.6.3.1 helped to identify:

- Potential gas accumulation locations in the passive core cooling system piping.
- Potential gas intrusion mechanisms during various plant conditions (including plant startup, shutdown, post-maintenance system restoration and filling, power operation, and accident conditions).
- Passive core cooling system design features to provide the capability to perform system high-point venting and to continuously monitor several high-point locations.

These passive core cooling system design features help to eliminate the potential for significant gas accumulation in specific passive safety system injection lines that could adversely impact passive safety system operation. System venting capabilities are provided for the following passive safety system locations:

- IRWST injection line squib valve inlet lines

- Vents located at the piping high points upstream of the parallel paths in both IRWST safety injection lines
 - Vents located between the check and squib valves in each line of the parallel paths in both IRWST safety injection lines
- Core makeup tank outlet lines
 - Vents located upstream of the first check valves in both core makeup tank outlet lines
 - Vents located between the series check valves in the core makeup tank A outlet line
 - Vents located between the second check and manual isolation valves in both core makeup tank outlet lines
- Containment recirculation Line A
 - Vents located at the high points in the common containment recirculation Line A path between the recirculation squib valves and the IRWST injection line (before and after the spent fuel system connection tee)

The potential for gas accumulation in passive safety system IRWST injection lines following accumulator injection is precluded by connecting the accumulator injection line in the direct vessel injection line riser section vertically above the IRWST injection line connection to the direct vessel injection line riser.

In addition, passive safety system design features are provided to monitor for gas accumulation at several specific locations. These design features include pipe stub gas collection chambers with redundant instrumentation at each high point, are continuously monitored and alarmed, have hard piped vent lines, are accessible during power operation, and include Technical Specifications and Surveillance Requirements specifically intended to identify unintended gas accumulations that could potentially challenge passive safety system operability for the following locations:

- Core makeup tank inlet highpoints
- Passive residual heat removal heat exchanger inlet high point
- IRWST injection line squib valve outlet high points

To ensure that all of the vent locations identified above function properly, notes are included on the system piping and instrumentation diagrams that specify layout sloping requirements. The intent of the layout requirements is to help ensure that the installed vents can effectively vent accumulated gases from the associated line segments. These notes also appear on the isometric drawings to make certain that the layout sloping requirements are observed during fabrication, construction, and installation.

The continuously monitored and alarmed pipe stub gas collection chamber, including Technical Specifications and Surveillance Requirements, was not utilized for the high points in the containment recirculation Line A because there are no credible postulated gas intrusion

mechanisms by which gas is expected to migrate into these lines (except in the event of improper venting during line filling operations such as after maintenance). This isolated piping section is maintained in a standby condition prior to passive safety system actuation. This local high point is located between the containment recirculation squib valves and the IRWST injection line squib valves, and it remains connected to the IRWST so that the tank water elevation head maintains the pressure in this line prior to actuation.

Passive safety system locations equipped with manual vent valves will be inspected according to the system surveillance and venting procedures to eliminate any identified gas accumulation. Locations equipped with pipe stub gas collection and alarm features will be continuously monitored via alarm indications in the main control room. Because the locations with pipe stub collection and alarm features are continuously monitored and have Surveillance Requirements and Required Actions, the potential exists that these locations will be vented at RCS pressure. Consequently, these locations have manual vent valves and are hard-piped to either the IRWST or the reactor coolant drain tank for potential venting at RCS pressure.

For the AP1000, the structures, systems, and components (SSCs) of the passive safety systems that are used to establish and maintain safe shutdown conditions for the plant are identified and discussed in subsections 7.4.1.1 and 7.4.2, and listed in Table 7.4-1. These same SSCs that provide the AP1000 safe shutdown capability also provide the passive, safety-related accident mitigation functions, including those that are equivalent to the emergency core cooling system, decay heat removal, and containment spray system functions for active plants specified in the generic letter.

6.3.7 Instrumentation Requirements

Instrumentation channels employed for actuation of passive core cooling system operation are described in Section 7.3. This subsection describes the instrumentation provided for monitoring passive core cooling system components during normal plant operation and also during passive core cooling system post-accident operation. Alarms are annunciated in the main control room.

6.3.7.1 Pressure Indication

6.3.7.1.1 Accumulator Pressure

Two pressure channels are installed on each accumulator. The pressure indications are used to confirm that accumulator pressure is within bounds of the assumptions used in the safety analysis. Each channel provides pressure indication in the main control room and also provides high-pressure and low-pressure alarms.

6.3.7.1.2 Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Pressure

One pressure indicator is installed on the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger inlet line. The pressure indication is used to assist the operators in determining if there is a leak in the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. The instrument provides pressure indication in the main control room.

6.3.7.2 Temperature Indication**6.3.7.2.1 Core Makeup Tank Inlet Line Temperature**

Individual temperature channels are installed on the inlet line for each core makeup tank. The temperature indication is used to determine if there is a sufficient thermal gradient for system operation. Each channel provides temperature indication in the main control room and also provides a low-temperature alarm.

6.3.7.2.2 Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Inlet Temperature

One temperature channel is installed on the inlet line to the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger. The temperature indication is used to detect reactor coolant system leakage into the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger, either through the discharge valves or from tube leakage into the in-containment refueling water storage tank, and to identify the leakage path. The channel provides temperature indication in the main control room and also provides a high-temperature alarm.

6.3.7.2.3 In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank Temperature

Four temperature channels are installed on the in-containment refueling water storage tank. The temperature indications are used to confirm that in-containment refueling water storage tank temperature is within the bounds of the assumptions used in the safety analysis. The temperature indications are also used to monitor in-containment refueling water storage tank temperature during passive core cooling system operation. Each channel provides temperature indication and high-temperature alarms in the main control room.

6.3.7.2.4 Core Makeup Tank Outlet Line Temperature

Two temperature channels are installed, one on each core makeup tank outlet line. The temperature indication is used to detect reactor coolant system leakage into the core makeup tanks. Each channel provides temperature indication in the main control room and also provides a high-temperature alarm.

6.3.7.2.5 Direct Vessel Injection Line Temperature

Two temperature channels are installed, one on each direct vessel injection line. The temperature indication is used to detect reactor coolant system leakage back through the direct vessel injection lines to the core makeup tanks, accumulator, or in-containment refueling water storage tank. Each channel provides temperature indication in the main control room.

6.3.7.2.6 Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Inlet High Point Temperature

One temperature channel is installed on the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger inlet line. The temperature indication is used to determine that the temperature in the inlet is within the bounds of the assumptions used in the safety analysis. The channel provides temperature indication and a low temperature alarm in the main control room.

6.3.7.3 Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Outlet Flow Indication

Two flow channels are installed on the passive residual heat removal outlet line. The flow indications are used to monitor and control passive residual heat removal heat exchanger operation. Each channel provides flow indication in the main control room.

6.3.7.4 Level Indication**6.3.7.4.1 Core Makeup Tank Level**

Ten level channels are installed on each core makeup tank. There are 2 wide range level channels which are used to confirm that the core makeup tanks are maintained at full water level during normal operation. There are four narrow range level channels which are used to control the actuation of the automatic depressurization system stage 1 valves. There are four narrow range level channels which are used to control the actuation of the automatic depressurization system stage 4 valves. Each wide range channel provides level indication and alarms in the main control room. Each narrow range channel provides level indication and alarms in the main control room and actuation of the automatic depressurization system. Each set of two narrow range channels share upper and lower level tap connections with the core makeup tanks; a failure modes and effects analysis confirms the ability of this arrangement to tolerate single failures (Reference 2).

6.3.7.4.2 Accumulator Level

Two level channels are installed on each accumulator. The level indications are used to confirm that accumulator level is within bounds of the assumptions used in the safety analysis. Each channel provides level indication and both high and low level alarms in the main control room.

6.3.7.4.3 In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank Level

Six level channels are installed on the in-containment refueling water storage tank. There are two narrow range channels. These level indications are used to confirm that in-containment refueling water storage tank level is within the bounds of the assumptions used in the safety analysis. There are four wide range level channels. These level indications are used to provide containment recirculation valve repositioning. Each channel provides level indication in the main control room and provides level alarms.

The in-containment refueling water storage tank is sized and the level alarm setpoints selected to provide adequate in-containment refueling water storage tank injection (and spill flow to containment for a direct vessel injection line break) until containment floodup is sufficient to provide recirculation flow.

6.3.7.4.4 Containment Level

Three level channels are installed on the containment. The level indications are used to monitor containment level from the reactor vessel cavity up to the maximum containment floodup elevation. Each channel provides level indication and alarms in the main control room.

6.3.7.5 Containment Radiation Level

Four channels are installed for the containment radiation. The radiation indications are used to monitor containment conditions. Each channel provides radiation indication and high radiation alarms in the main control room. Section 11.5 provides additional information.

6.3.7.6 Valve Position Indication and Control**6.3.7.6.1 Valve Position Indication**

Individual valve position is provided for the safety-related, remotely actuated valves listed in Table 6.3-1. In addition, valve position is provided for certain manually operated valves, as described in subsection 6.3.2.2.8.2, that can isolate redundant passive core cooling equipment, if mispositioned. The incontainment refueling water injection check valves and containment recirculation check valves have nonintrusive position indication.

For certain passive core cooling system valves with position indication, alarms in the main control room are provided to alert the operators to valve mispositioning. For the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger discharge valves, valve position indication is used to initiate a reactor trip upon opening of these valves while the reactor is at power.

6.3.7.6.2 Valve Position Control

Valve controls are provided for remotely operated passive core cooling system valves. Table 6.3-1 provides a list of the passive core cooling system remotely operated valves. These remotely operated valves have controls in the main control room.

6.3.7.6.2.1 Accumulator Motor-Operated Valve Controls

As part of the plant shutdown procedures, the operator is required to close the accumulator motor-operated valves. This prevents a loss of accumulator water inventory to the reactor coolant system when the reactor coolant system is depressurized. The valves are closed after the reactor coolant system has been depressurized to below the setpoint to block the safeguards actuation signal. The redundant pressure and level alarms on each accumulator function to alert the operator to close these valves, if any are inadvertently left open. Power is locked out after the valves are closed. During plant startup, the operator is directed by plant procedures to energize and open these valves prior to reaching the reactor coolant system pressure setpoint that unblocks the safeguards actuation signal. Redundant indication and alarms are available to alert the operator if a valve is inadvertently left closed once the reactor coolant system pressure increases beyond the setpoint. Power is also locked out after these valves are opened.

The accumulator isolation valves are not required to move during power operation. For a description of limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements of these valves, refer to the technical specifications. The accumulator isolation valves receive a safeguards actuation signal to confirm that they are open in the event of an accident. As a result of the power lock out, technical specifications, and the redundant position indication and alarms, the valve controls are nonsafety-related.

6.3.7.6.2.2 In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank Injection Motor-Operated Valve Controls

The motor-operated valves in each in-containment refueling water storage tank injection line are normally open during all modes of normal plant operation. Power to these valves is locked out. Redundant valve position indication and alarms are provided to alert the operator if a valve is inadvertently closed. The technical specifications specify surveillances to show that these valves are open. These valves also receive a safeguards actuation signal to confirm that they are open in the event of an accident. As a result of the power lock out, the redundant position indication and alarms and the technical specifications the valve controls are nonsafety-related.

6.3.7.6.2.3 Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger Inlet Motor-Operated Valve Control

The motor-operated valve in the passive residual heat removal heat exchanger inlet line is normally open during normal plant operation. Power to this valve is locked out. Redundant valve position indications and alarms are provided to alert the operator if the valve is open. This valve also receives an actuation signal to confirm that it is open in the event of an accident.

6.3.7.7 Automatic Depressurization System Actuation at 24 Hours

A timer is used to automatically actuate the automatic depressurization system if offsite and onsite power are lost for about 24 hours. This prevents discharging the Class 1E dc power sources such that they are no longer able to operate the automatic depressurization system valves. If power becomes available to the dc batteries and they are no longer discharging prior to activation of the timer, then the automatic depressurization system actuation would be delayed. If the plant does not need actuation of the automatic depressurization system based on having stable pressurizer level, full core makeup tanks, and high and stable in-containment refueling water storage tank levels, the operators are directed to de-energize all loads on the 24-hour batteries. This action will block actuation of the automatic depressurization system and allow for its actuation later should the plant conditions unexpectedly degrade.

6.3.8 Combined License Information**6.3.8.1 Containment Cleanliness Program**

The Combined License applicants referencing the AP1000 will address preparation of a program to limit the amount of debris that might be left in the containment following refueling and maintenance outages. The cleanliness program will limit the storage of outage materials (such as temporary scaffolding and tools) inside containment during power operation to items that do not produce debris (physical or chemical), which could be transported to the containment recirculation screens, to the IRWST screens, or into a direct vessel injection or a cold leg LOCA break that becomes submerged during recirculation. The cleanliness program shall limit the amount of latent debris and fibrous material located within the containment, as identified in subsection 6.3.2.2.7.1, item 12.

6.3.8.2 Verification of Water Sources for Long-Term Recirculation Cooling Following a LOCA

The Combined License information requested in this subsection has been fully addressed in APP-GW-GLR-079 (Reference 3), and the applicable changes are incorporated into the DCD. The design of the recirculation screens is complete. Testing to assess the screen performance and downstream effects is complete. A study of the effects of screen design and performance on long-term cooling is complete. No additional work is required by the Combined License applicant to address the aspects of the Combined License information requested in this subsection.

The following words represent the original Combined License Information Item commitment, which has been addressed as discussed above:

The Combined License applicants referencing the AP1000 will perform an evaluation consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.82, revision 3, and subsequently approved NRC guidance, to demonstrate that adequate long-term core cooling is available considering debris resulting from a LOCA together with debris that exists before a LOCA. As discussed in DCD subsection 6.3.2.2.7.1, a LOCA in the AP1000 does not generate fibrous debris due to damage to insulation or other materials included in the AP1000 design. The evaluation will consider resident fibers and particles that could be present considering the plant design, location, and containment cleanliness program. The determination of the characteristics of such resident debris will be based on sample measurements from operating plants. The evaluation will also consider the potential for the generation of chemical debris (precipitants). The potential to generate such debris will be determined considering the materials used inside the AP1000 containment, the post-accident water chemistry of the AP1000, and the applicable research/testing.

6.3.9 References

1. WCAP-8966, "Evaluation of Mispositioned ECCS Valves," September 1977.
2. WCAP-13594 (P), WCAP-13662 (NP), "FMEA of Advanced Passive Plant Protection System," Revision 1, June 1998.
3. APP-GW-GLR-079, "AP1000 Verification of Water Sources for Long-Term Recirculation Cooling Following a LOCA," Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.
4. APP-GW-GLN-147, "AP1000 Containment Recirculation and IRWST Screen Design," Westinghouse Electric Company LLC.

Table 6.3-1				
PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM - REMOTE ACTUATION VALVES				
	Normal Position	Actuation Position	Failed Position	Notes
Core Makeup Tanks CMT inlet isolation MOV (V002A/B) CMT outlet isolation AOV (V014A/B, V015A/B)	Open Closed	Open Open	As is Open	(1,4)
Accumulators Accumulator discharge MOV (V027A/B)	Open	Open	As is	(2,4)
In-Containment Refueling Water Storage Tank IRWST injection line MOV (V121A/B) IRWST injection line squib (V123A/B, V125A/B)	Open Closed	Open Open	As is As is	(2,4)
Containment Recirculation Sump Valves Recirculation line MOVs (V117A/B) Recirculation line squib valves (V118A/B, V120A/B)	Open Closed	Open Open	As is As is	(3,4)
Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger PRHR HX inlet MOV (V101) PRHR HX outlet AOVs (V108A/B) IRWST gutter isolation AOVs (V130A/B)	Open Closed Open	Open Open Closed	As is Open Closed	(2,4)
Automatic Depressurization System Valves ADS Stage 1 MOVs (V001A/B, V011A/B) ADS Stage 2 MOVs (V002A/B, V012A/B) ADS Stage 3 MOVs (V003A/B, V013A/B) ADS Stage 4 MOVs (V014A/B/C/D) ADS Stage 4 squib valves (V004A/B/C/D)	Closed Closed Closed Open Closed	Open Open Open Open Open	As is As is As is As is As is	(3,4)

Notes:

- (1) These valves are normally in the correct post-accident position, but receive confirmatory actuation signals to redundant controllers.
- (2) These valves are normally in the correct post-accident position with their power locked out. They also receive confirmatory actuation signals.
- (3) These valves are normally in the correct post-accident position, but receive confirmatory actuation signals.
- (4) The operation of these valves is not safety-related.

Table 6.3-2 (Sheet 1 of 2)

COMPONENT DATA - PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM

Passive RHR HX	
Number	1
Type	Vertical C-Tube
Case	Design
Heat transfer (BTU/hr)	2.01 E+08
	<u>Tube side</u> <u>Shell side</u>
Fluid	Reactor coolant IRWST water
Design flow (lb/hr)	5.03 E+05 N/A
Temperature in (°F)	567 120
out (°F)	199 N/A
Design pressure (psig)	2485 N/A
Design temperature (°F)	650 N/A
Material	Alloy 690 N/A
AP1000 equipment class	A N/A
Core Makeup Tanks	
Number	2
Type	Vertical, cylindrical, hemispherical heads
Volume (cubic feet)	2500
Design pressure (psig)	2485
Design temperature (°F)	650
Material	Carbon-steel, stainless steel clad
AP1000 equipment class	A
Accumulators	
Number	2
Type	Spherical
Volume (cubic feet)	2000
Design pressure (psig)	800
Design temperature (°F)	300
Material	Carbon-steel, stainless steel clad
AP1000 equipment class	C

Table 6.3-2 (Sheet 2 of 2)

COMPONENT DATA - PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM

COMPONENT DATA - PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM		
IRWST		
Number	1	
Type	Integral to containment internal structure	
Volume, minimum water (cubic feet)	73,100	
Design pressure (psig)	5	
Design temperature (°F)	150 *	
Material	Wetted surfaces are stainless steel	
AP1000 equipment class	C	
Spargers		
Number	2	
Type	Cruciform	
Flow area of holes (in ²)	274	
Design pressure (psig)	600	
Design temperature (°F)	500	
Material	Stainless Steel	
AP1000 equipment class	C	
pH Adjustment Baskets		
Number	4	
Type	Rectangular	
Volume minimum total (cubic feet)	560	
Material	Stainless steel	
AP1000 equipment class	C	
Screens	<u>IRWST</u>	<u>Containment Recirculation</u>
Number	3	2
Surface area, screen (square feet)	IRWST Screens A and B: ≥ 500 per screen IRWST Screen C: ≥ 1000 ft ²	≥ 2,500 per screen
Material	Stainless steel	Stainless steel
AP1000 equipment class	C	C

Note:

* Several times during plant life, the refueling water could reach 250°F.

Table 6.3-3 (Sheet 1 of 4)

**FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS -
PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS**

Component	Failure Mode	Plant Condition	Effect on System Operation	Failure Detection Method	Remarks
CMT outlet isolation AOVs V014A/B, V015A/B Normally closed/ fail open	Failure to open on demand	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant, parallel isolation AOV, actuated by a separate division, which provides flow through a parallel branch line for the affected CMT. The other CMT is unaffected.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
CMT discharge line check valves V016A/B, V017A/B Normally open	Failure to close on reverse flow	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant, series check valve which closes to prevent reverse flow, during a cold leg (large) LOCA or cold leg balance line break, preventing accumulator flow from bypassing the reactor vessel.	No valve position indication	
Accumulator nitrogen supply/vent valves V021A/B, V045 Normally closed/ fail closed	Spurious opening	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has either a normally closed redundant, series isolation SOV or a check valve in each vent flow path, that prevents accumulator nitrogen from leaking out of the accumulator, which could degrade accumulator injection.	No valve position indication Accumulator low pressure alarm in MCR and at RSW	
Accumulator nitrogen supply containment isolation AOV V042 Normally open/ fail closed	Failure to close on demand	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant, series isolation check valve which independently closes on reverse flow in the line, preventing reactor coolant from leaking out of containment.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
Accumulator nitrogen supply containment isolation check valve V043 Normally open	Failure to close on reverse flow	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant, series isolation AOV, actuated by a separate division, which closes to prevent reactor coolant from leaking out of containment.	No valve position indication	

Table 6.3-3 (Sheet 2 of 4)

**FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS -
PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS**

Component	Failure Mode	Plant Condition	Effect on System Operation	Failure Detection Method	Remarks
PRHR HX outlet line isolation AOVs V108A/B Normally closed/fail open	Failure to open	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant, parallel isolation AOV, actuated by a separate division, which opens to provide PRHR HX flow through a parallel branch line.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW PRHR HX flow indication in MCR & RSW	
IRWST gravity injection line check valves V122A/B, V124A/B Normally closed	Failure to open	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant flow path through a check valve and a squib valve that open to provide gravity injection through a parallel branch line. The other IRWST gravity injection line is unaffected.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
IRWST gravity injection line squib valves V123A/B, V125A/B Normally closed/fail as is	Failure to open	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant flow path through a check valve and a squib valve that open to provide gravity injection through a parallel branch line. The other IRWST gravity injection line is unaffected.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
IRWST gutter isolation valves V130A/B Normally open/fail closed	Failure to close	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant, series isolation AOV, actuated by a separate division, which closes to divert the gutter flow into the IRWST.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
Containment recirculation line check valves V119A/B Normally closed	Failure to open	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant flow path through a MOV and a squib valve, actuated by separate divisions, that open to provide recirculation through a parallel branch line. The other containment recirculation line is unaffected.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	

Table 6.3-3 (Sheet 3 of 4)

**FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS -
PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS**

Component	Failure Mode	Plant Condition	Effect on System Operation	Failure Detection Method	Remarks
Containment recirculation line squib valves V120A/B Normally closed/ fail as is	Failure to open	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant flow path through a MOV and a squib valve, actuated by separate divisions, that open to provide recirculation through a parallel branch line. The other containment recirculation line is unaffected.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
Containment recirculation line squib valves V118A/B Normally closed/ fail as is	Failure to open	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant flow path through a check valve and a squib valve, actuated by separate divisions, that independently open to provide recirculation through a parallel branch line. The other containment recirculation line is unaffected.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
Accumulator fill/drain line isolation AOVs V232A/B Normally closed/ fail closed	Spurious opening	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a normally closed redundant, series isolation valve in each drain flow path, which prevents draining water from the accumulator.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
CMT fill line isolation AOVs V230A/B Normally closed/ fail closed	Spurious opening	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a redundant, series check valve that closes on reverse flow and prevents draining water from the CMT.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
CMT fill line check valves V231A/B Normally closed	Failure to close on reverse flow	All design basis events	No safety-related effect since each valve has a normally closed redundant, series AOV that prevents draining water from the CMT.	No valve position indication CMT low level indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	

Table 6.3-3 (Sheet 4 of 4)

**FAILURE MODE AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS -
PASSIVE CORE COOLING SYSTEM COMPONENTS**

Component	Failure Mode	Plant Condition	Effect on System Operation	Failure Detection Method	Remarks
ADS Stage 1 to 3 MOVs and Stage 4 squib valves V001A/B, V011A/B, V002A/B, V012A/B, V003A/B, V013A/B, V004A/B/C/D Normally closed/ fail as is	Failure to open on demand	All design basis events	Failure to open blocks reactor coolant system vent flow through the one of two parallel branch lines of the affected ADS valve stage. Failure of a Stage 4 ADS valve is the most limiting single valve failure from the standpoint of ADS performance, based on this stage being the largest valve size. With the failure of ADS path, the ADS vent flow capacity is reduced, but safety analysis has demonstrated that the limiting Stage 4 ADS valve failure still meets design basis reactor coolant system venting requirements.	Valve position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	
Class 1E direct current and UPS system distribution switchgear division IDSA DS 1 IDSB DS 1 IDSC DS 1 IDSD DS 1	Failure of a dc power source	All design basis events	Failure of a single dc power source from either Division A or Division B is the most limiting dc failure. The limiting PXS components are the IRWST injection/containment recirc. valves and the ADS valves. Failure of either of these dc power sources can prevent actuation of the ADS Stage 1 and Stage 3 MOVs in one group of ADS valves. The other ADS valves are unaffected by this failure. This dc power failure can also cause failure of one (of 4) IRWST injection squib valves and one (of 4) squib recirculation valves. The ADS vent flow and IRWST injection/containment recirculation capacity is reduced, but safety analysis has demonstrated that this limiting valve failure combination still meets design basis reactor coolant system venting/injection requirements.	Valves position indication alarm in MCR and at RSW	For other PXS components, the loss of a Class 1E division either actuates the affected AOVs to a fail-safe position, or does not affect MOVs which are already in appropriate positions

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


Figure 6.3-1

Passive Core Cooling System
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (Sheet 1)





Figure 6.3-2


Passive Core Cooling System
Piping and Instrumentation Diagram (Sheet 2)



Inside Reactor Containment

Figure 6.3-3

**Passive Safety Injection
(REF) RCS & PXS**



Inside Reactor Containment

Figure 6.3-4

**Passive Decay Heat Removal
(REF) RCS & PXS**




Figure 6.3-5

Passive Heat Removal Heat Exchanger




Figure 6.3-6

IRWST Screen Plan Location




Figure 6.3-7

IRWST Screen Section Location





Figure 6.3-8

Containment Recirculation Screen Location Plan



NOTE 1 - MINIMUM PLATE SIZE AND ELEVATION LIMITS
ARE DEFINED IN SUBSECTION 6.3.2.2.7.1.

Figure 6.3-9

Containment Recirculation Screen Location Elevation